CHAPTER 14

Emotion as Value

Presupposes: the self-vindication mechanism (Ch. 1); the structural dependence of content on contrast (Ch. 2); the containment norm and the exhibitive closure (Ch. 7, §§3, 4.1); the representational explanation of the illusion (Ch. 8, §3); the categorical transition principle and the three-cell partition of mental features (Ch. 13, §§2.2–2.3); the reply to the universality objection (Ch. 20, §5.2), used at §A.2.

Establishes: the response-constitutive account of value; the two constitutive forms of goodness — aesthetic and empathic — with orthotic goodness as cognitive rather than modal; the identification of morality as empathic evaluation of chosen behaviour; the vacancy, containment, parity and commitment results, with the quarantine of the field; the field and the pull, which states the cost of the premise the quarantine uses; and the informed-registration anchor.

In brief. After tasting several foods, could you decide which tastes best without any emotional response? After hearing several melodies, could you rank their beauty while feeling nothing? Strip away emotion and every difference between things remains — detectable, classifiable, complete — except the difference between *better and worse*. This chapter argues that evaluative difference stands to emotion as colour stands to vision: real once constituted, response-dependent always. Its single sharpest instrument is the *vacancy result*: the clause "value obtains independently of every response" turns out to mark no contrast by any route the account can locate — a result that leaves the realist two tolled exits — and both wings of metaethics needed it, the realist to affirm and the error theorist to mourn. The surprise is where this leaves the account: not anti-realism, but realism with the one clause that says nothing removed. And the moral fact is anchored where it always was: in the affected party's own registration, not the onlooker's. One thing the account does not supply: registrations do not sum across their bearers, so the account has no first-order resource for weighing one party's agony against a million inconveniences (§6.5), and every applied verdict inherits that residue.

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1 Introduction

After tasting several foods, could you determine which tastes best without an emotional response? After hearing several melodies, could you rank their beauty without feeling anything?

Strip away emotion and the differences between things remain — detectable, classifiable, complete — while the differences between *better and worse* vanish. The evaluative landscape goes dark.

This chapter argues that the darkness is diagnostic: evaluative difference is a distinct category of difference, and emotion is the modality whose response constitutes it.

The claim is structural, and "constitute" is chosen against "detect". Wavelengths exist without visual systems; colours do not. Colour is what obtains when a visual system responds differentially to light: real once constituted, response-dependent always. Evaluative difference stands to emotion as chromatic difference stands to vision. Physiological states, behaviours, and situations exist independently of any evaluative modality; their goodness and badness do not. The account thereby grounds the perceptual theory of emotion (Tappolet, 2016; Döring, 2007) rather than asserting it, and stands within response-dependent value realism (McDowell, 1985; Wiggins, 1987) while supplying what that tradition has lacked: a derivation, from the metaphysics of difference, of why evaluative properties are response-dependent.

The chapter's spine is the argument of §3. It asks what a value would have to be if it obtained independently of every response, and finds that the question has three answers, of which only one supplies what a value must supply, a direction (§3.5). It then asks whether the clause "value obtains independently of every response" says anything at all, and finds that it does not (§3.6), and that everything the robust realist wanted to keep survives without it (§3.7). The appendix carries the argument to the rest of the field: what realism claims as its advantage, what the error theory charges, and where each rival stands once the clause is retired.

One commitment carries that finding, and a realist will press it first, so it is stated here. Call it the anchoring requirement: a word carries no content beyond what some registered contrast supplies it, so a vocabulary that turns on itself must exit somewhere into a registered

contrast. Section 3.6 defends the requirement against the charge of verificationism, and says what its refuser keeps and what she loses.

One limit stands beside the results, because every later chapter inherits it. Registrations are proprietary to their bearers, so the account returns no fact about how one party's registration weighs against another's: there is no scale on which one agony and a million inconveniences are quantities of a common stuff (§6.5). What it supplies instead is the operation by which a trade-off is settled where anything settles it, mutual registration, converging on an outcome or, failing that, on a procedure (Chapter 15, §4.4).

Section 2 fixes the machinery: modalities, the categories their responses constitute, and, before the vocabulary of misreading is allowed to do any work, the non-teleological standard by which a response can be inaccurate (§2.2). Section 4 derives the two constitutive forms of goodness, aesthetic and empathic, and distinguishes both from orthotic assessment. Section 5 identifies morality and hands it to Chapter 16. Section 6 answers objections in ascending order of strength.

2 Categories of Difference and Their Modalities

2.1 Categories are response-constituted

Not all differences are of the same kind. The difference between red and blue is chromatic; between middle C and high C, auditory; between rough and smooth, tactile. These are not instances of a single generic "difference" but types, each individuated by the modality whose response constitutes it: chromatic differences by visual systems responding to wavelength differences, auditory by auditory systems responding to frequency differences. In each case the underlying physical variation exists independently of the modality while the categorised difference does not, since colour is a property of the visual system's response to light rather than of light itself.

This is why modalities are category-bound. Vision cannot detect auditory differences, not through an engineering limitation but because auditory differences are constituted by auditory responses. Each

modality constitutes the category it is sensitive to, and no modality can constitute another's domain.

The claim is indifferent to hardware. Vision happens to have a localised organ, emotion is distributed across neural and bodily systems, and nothing in the constitutive relationship turns on the difference. Nor is calibration variability an objection: colour perception varies with cone distributions, context, and language (Roberson et al., 2000) without ceasing to be a modality. The modality is the capacity for the constituting response; the calibration — which stimuli trigger which responses — is shaped by history, and varies.

The word "response" must be dissected before it bears weight, because ordinary usage fuses three layers the framework keeps apart. In the first, a response is a causal reaction: the thermostat to temperature, the litmus paper to acid — registration of nothing by nothing. In the second, a response is a registration: a system detects a contrast and adjusts — discrimination without anything it is like to discriminate. In the third, a response is an *oriented* registration: the contrast is not merely detected but felt as a pull toward or away: valence, the second axis of Chapter 13 (§2.3), which switches on at sentience. The response that constitutes evaluative difference is the third and only the third. "Response-constitutive" therefore names no behaviourism and no dispositional reduction: a thermostat's reactions constitute nothing evaluative, and neither would a complete causal-functional description of approach and withdrawal. Where this chapter says that emotion constitutes value, the constituting layer begins where valence begins.

One dependency completes the dissection. The account requires from Chapter 13 only the two axes, their exhaustiveness, and the existence of valence; the levels architecture frames the exposition and supplies no premise. A reader who rejects the hierarchy of levels rejects nothing this chapter uses.

2.2 Constitution without teleology

One word must be banned from the account before it does damage, since the ban is a thesis. The account will speak throughout of

misreading, of impairment, of a modality's failing its object — vocabulary that appears to measure the modality against what it is for, and functions need assigners.

Evolution, the only naturalistic candidate, assigns the wrong one. The empathic capacity was shaped for kin-biased cooperation, fires hardest for the near and the similar, goes numb at statistics, and is cheaply hijacked. A critic is entitled to observe that, graded against its selected function, the parochial empath is performing to specification and the psychopath is an alternative strategy rather than a breakdown. If the account's normative vocabulary rested on a function, it would rest on a stipulation.

The identity, not the function. It rests on an identity. A modality is individuated by its object rather than by a purpose: vision is not a tool aimed at light but the differential response to light. That is why an evolved visual system's blind spot, its narrow spectral window, and its failure in darkness are describable as limits — the object outruns the implementation, which the object grades. Colour-blindness is called a deficiency without invoking evolution's intentions or a norm of seeing. The wavelength differences are really there, the capacity to differentiate them is present in some systems and reduced in this one, so "deficient" is description rather than verdict.

Empathy stands to affected parties' registrations as vision stands to light. It is not for tracking them; it is the oriented response to them. Since the registrations are real (§6.4) and reach far beyond any implementation's native range, the implementation's parochialism, its innumeracy, and its hijackability are describable as limitation and inaccuracy on the same purely descriptive ground. Selection history explains why the instrument exists; the object fixes what counts as reading it. The telescope is explained by its makers and graded by the stars.

The consequence for the account's hardest case can be stated now and inherited later (Chapter 16, §5.2). The psychopath's condition is not empathy malfunctioning but empathy reduced or absent, less of the modality, as colour-blindness is less of vision. His verdict "nothing bad

here", delivered over a registered suffering, is false the ordinary way, since it misdescribes a fact that obtains in the sufferer. No cosmic norm convicts him and none is needed. He is inaccurate about the world; the practice responds to inaccuracy with correction and containment rather than desert (Chapters 18, 20); and the account's entire normative vocabulary — misreading, distortion, corruption — is hereby fixed as accuracy-vocabulary, answerable to objects, with no teleology anywhere in it.

One open question is owed a flag rather than a burial. The naturalised-content tradition (Millikan, 1984; Dretske, 1988) holds that misrepresentation itself cannot be defined without a function-story, in which case a residue of teleology would re-enter through the theory of content one level below the present argument. The contrastive semantics of Chapter 2 is designed to individuate content without teleosemantic apparatus, a content being a diff registered or misregistered against its object, so the account proceeds on that basis. Whether contrastive individuation fully discharges the misrepresentation problem is a question for the theory of content, recorded here as open.

3 Emotion as the Evaluative Modality

Part one: the constitutive argument (§§3.1–3.7). What the evaluative modality is, what a response-independent favouring would have to be, and why the clause that names it says nothing.

3.1 The irreducibility of evaluative difference

Consider two experiential states: the taste of a ripe strawberry and the taste of a lemon. A system with sensory modalities can register numerous differences between them: chemical composition, receptor activation, associated properties. A system with cognitive capacities can register relational differences: the strawberry is sweeter, the lemon more acidic. All of these are non-evaluative differences, differences in what the states are like. But there is a further difference, not derivable from any combination of these: which tastes *better*. A complete chemical

analysis does not deliver it; a complete neurological map does not determine it.

The irreducibility can be exhibited by a thought experiment. A being with perfect sensory and cognitive faculties but no affective capacity can distinguish every chromatic, auditory, tactile, and gustatory difference; it can classify, compare, and describe. It cannot determine which of anything is better or worse. The evaluative category is invisible to it, not for want of information (it has all the non-evaluative information there is) but for want of the modality whose response constitutes evaluative differences.

What individuates the evaluative category is orientation. Chromatic differences are unoriented: red differs from blue, but neither is "toward" or "away from". Evaluative differences are constitutively oriented: better pulls, worse pushes. This oriented character, valence, is what makes evaluative difference the basis of preference, choice, and action, which no non-evaluative category possesses.

3.2 The constitutive claim

If evaluative difference is a distinct category requiring its own constitutive modality, the modality is emotion: the affective capacity through which sentient beings generate the oriented differences between better and worse. The positive or negative valence of an emotion is the evaluative analogue of the chromatic character of a visual experience, the qualitative profile through which the modality constitutes its category. The claim is structural rather than metaphorical. Without vision there are wavelength differences but no colours; without emotion there are non-evaluative differences but no values. The modality does not accompany or facilitate evaluation; it is what makes evaluation possible.

3.3 Rival theories

The feeling theory (James, 1884; Damasio, 1994) holds that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. The account shares its insistence on felt, qualitative states irreducible to cognition, while relocating the content: the emotion constitutes an evaluative difference,

an oriented relationship between the system and its situation, of which the bodily change is the vehicle. This is why emotions are about things — the grief is about the loss, not the tightness in the chest — which the feeling theory struggles to explain. The evaluative difference is constituted in response to a specific non-evaluative input, so the experience inherits its object from it.

The judgement theory (Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, 1976) holds that emotions are evaluative judgements. The account grants that emotions involve cognitive content, since a fear about nothing is not a fear, while denying that the evaluative character is constituted by the cognitive content alone: a system that judges "this is a significant loss" without affective response has identified a non-evaluative fact and constituted no evaluative difference.

Recalcitrant emotions decide between the views. Nussbaum must either deny that phobias are emotions or credit the phobic with contradictory judgements. The present account gives the cleaner analysis: the cognitive system judges the stimulus harmless while the evaluative modality responds with aversion regardless, its calibration set by associative history rather than current assessment. Recalcitrant emotion is the evaluative analogue of visual illusion, two modalities delivering conflicting verdicts, and, like an illusion, it is not merely a divergent verdict but a possible misreading of the features it is directed at, in the accuracy sense fixed at §2.2 and developed at §6.4.

The perceptual theory (Tappolet, 2016; Döring, 2007) holds that emotions are perceptions of evaluative properties. The account deepens it by explaining why the analogy holds: emotions are like perceptions because both are constitutive modalities for response-dependent categories of difference. Tappolet asserts the parallel from functional profile; the present account derives it from the relationship between modality and category. The attitudinal theory (Deonna & Teroni, 2012) holds that an emotion is a felt bodily attitude taken toward a content, with the evaluative character in the attitude and none in the content. The account agrees on the location, since the orientation is the second axis and the content the first (Chapter 13, §2.3), and adds what the attitudinal

theory leaves open: that the attitude constitutes the value it is taken as tracking.

3.4 Emotional equalisation

The equalisation principle (Chapter 6, §2.2) applies to emotion as to every modality. When evaluative differences are equalised, when positive and negative valence collapse into undifferentiated numbness, evaluative content is not minimised but abolished. Numbness is not faint feeling; it is the structural boundary of feeling, as blindness is of sight. The result is the modality's own equalisation case, doing the same work here that Chapter 6 did for cognition: it fixes the lower bound below which the category does not thin but ceases. What follows in §§3.5–3.7 turns that constitutive claim against the position it most threatens.

3.5 The direction projection

The realist's value has to favour something, and this section asks what a favouring that no one registers could be made of. There are three answers only — a structure, a felt pull, or nothing — and the first does not favour, the second is the account's own, and the third is empty.

What a favouring must contain. Begin with what any response-independent evaluative fact would have to contain. Evaluative difference, §3.1 established, is constitutively oriented: better pulls toward, worse pushes away. A wrongness with no against-ness in it, a wrongness that counted against nothing, would not be a wrongness at all. So the non-naturalist's fact must carry a direction; it must favour and forbid.

The trilemma asks what that direction is. Direction is detectable by two routes that deliver different things. From outside, direction is structure: a vector, a gradient, approach and withdrawal, describable without remainder in the third person. From inside, direction is felt: the pull as undergone, the qualitative to-and-fro of valence. Either the non-naturalist's favouring is the structural direction, or it is the felt direction, or it is a third thing he must name.

The first horn is inert. A structural direction, a pattern in the space of options, obliges no one and favours nothing. It is a signpost with no push, present in the thermostat and the falling rock, and whatever authority a value has, a vector does not have it. The second horn concedes the account, since a felt direction is valence, and a favouring that exists only as undergone is response-constituted by definition.

The third horn must be produced, and the exhaustiveness that forecloses it costs nothing from Chapter 13's positive theory. Chapter 13 (§2.3) records the independence from its own side: the trilemma draws on the derived tier of the two-axes result alone, since any registered contrast either transfers across registration systems or it does not. A contrast that transfers is structure, transferability being what structure is, the shape all registration shares. A contrast that does not transfer is proprietary to its register, and a proprietary contrast carrying orientation — a toward and an away belonging to the register that undergoes it — is valence, characterised by its functional role and nothing else.

The trilemma's horns are the three cells this partition permits a favouring to occupy: transferable (the inert vector), proprietary and oriented (the felt pull), or composed of no registered contrast, which is nothing. The third is closed by the closure of Chapter 7 in its exhibitive form (§4.1): every attempted exhibition of a counterexample individuates its candidate and grids it, so the horn closes without leaning on the contested ontic thesis a realist might refuse. The exhibitive form is established, at the tier of the premise its mechanism runs through; the trilemma claims no more for it.

Two evasions close immediately. A rationalist who posits a special rational modality with a proprietary orientation of its own has described valence under a ceremonial name. One who insists on a proprietary orientation that orients no one has returned to the first horn, since an orientation with no register to pull on is a vector.

The reference relocation. A realist of sufficient sophistication will accept the compositional result and relocate his claim from characterisation to reference. The model is semantic externalism:

"water" named H_2O across centuries in which no user could characterise H_2O, because reference can outstrip description (H. Putnam, 1975). Our concept of the good, he grants, is built from response-materials through and through, yet the word may nonetheless lock onto a response-independent property, as natural-kind terms lock onto essences their users cannot articulate. On the Lewisian variant it locks on by eliteness, reference gravitating to the most natural joint in the concept's vicinity (Lewis, 1983).

The reply is that both hooks, on their working models, require what the first horn removed. "Water" reaches H_2O because H_2O does something: it causes the experiences that prompt the term's use, regulates that use, and corrects it. The reference relation rides a causal commerce between word and world, so an inert favouring leaves no trace for a term's use to be regulated by.

The magnetic hook divides by metasemantics. Where eliteness earns its pull through explanatory work, an inert joint attracts nothing, by the same concession. The view's authors hold something stronger — naturalness as primitive, reference gravitating to the world's joints because that is what reference does (Lewis, 1983; Sider, 2011) — and against the primitive version the reply narrows while a remainder stands.

The narrow reply: a magnet breaks ties among the candidate contents a term's use leaves open, and a term whose vocabulary exits into no registration supplies no candidates for ties to be broken among (§3.6). The remainder: a theorist who takes primitive reference past mediating content altogether, the word reaching the joint with nothing in between, has stepped outside the reply. The cost is a primitive normative joint written into the world's structure, the anchoring question of §3.6 relocated to the concept of that joint, with the reliability circle below unclosed. The exit is counted, with its cost, at §A.4.

The non-naturalist has one reply left, his strongest: he can refuse the demand for composition outright. Favouring, he says, is not built from contrasts. It is a primitive, an unanalysable feature that the demand for constituents misdescribes.

This relocates the question rather than escaping it. A primitive is still a determinate item — this primitive rather than that, favouring rather than disfavouring — and a determinate item is individuated by what it excludes (Chapter 2). Ask what the primitive favouring excludes, whereupon the trilemma re-forms around the exclusion. The line between the favoured and the forbidden is a structural boundary, a vector and inert; or a felt one, the pull, which concedes the account; or a third boundary the non-naturalist must again characterise, where the characterisation meets the same compositional closure it met before. Primitiveness buys exemption from analysis into parts. It buys no exemption from determinacy, and determinacy is all the argument requires.

One escape remains to be costed, because its most careful author states it explicitly and rejects the premise the reference argument deploys. Enoch (2011) denies that normative facts must do causal or explanatory work at all. The badness of agony causes nothing and is known nonetheless, our normative beliefs made reliable by a third factor: selection shaped our responses toward survival, survival is by and large good, so the shaping aimed our beliefs at the truth without the truth ever touching them.

Against this figure the efficacy constraint cannot simply be repressed. What can be pressed is the cost of declining it, which falls due in reference. A term whose use nothing regulates faces the permutation problem in its sharpest form: if neither causal commerce nor explanatory eliteness fixes which inert property “good” names, nothing distinguishes its naming goodness from its naming any of the endless inert properties that fit the same usage equally well — a difficulty pressed from within the realist literature itself (Eklund, 2017). The third factor cannot do the fixing. It secures at best that our responses would co-vary with the property if the reference were already fixed, while it operates entirely on the response side of the relation it is meant to anchor.

Two positions entered explicitly. Two positions absent from the sorting by name should be entered on it explicitly. The hyperintensional non-naturalist refines the third cell’s occupancy claim: the response-

independent favouring, she holds, differs from every response-involving property hyperintensionally rather than merely in modal profile — in what it is, in the essence idiom (Fine, 1994) — so no coextension argument touches her.

The refinement changes the grain of the claim and none of its exposure, because the trilemma never ran on modal profile. The vacancy result individuates by constitution, by what composes the favouring, and a hyperintensional difference must be a difference in something. Essence-talk that distinguishes the favouring from every structural and every valenced item leaves it composed of neither structure nor valence, which is the third cell under finer notation, with the same costs itemised and the same reliability circle unclosed. The fine grain itself is real and the framework supplies it (Chapter 2, §2.4) — for contents, where there is something to compose.

The idiom also closes over its user. An essence-attribution is a content, individuated by excluding its rivals (Chapter 2, §2.4), so the claim that the favouring differs essentially from every response-involving property is stated by drawing a contrast. The trilemma asks of that contrast what it asks of every other: structural, felt, or composed of nothing. The essence idiom refines the notation of the demand and leaves its object inside the sorting.

Humean constructivism, Street's own positive view, belongs on the list for completeness: value is conferred within each agent's practical standpoint, whose contents are contingent all the way down. That is the second cell affirmed without this account's anchor, constitution by oriented response with the answerability of §6.4 declined. The difference shows just where the anchor predicts: on the standpoint view a fully coherent standpoint indifferent to the affected party grades as well as any other, so the disagreement is localised there, at the anchor, with the rest of the partition shared.

Why the intuition is undiscriminating. Why, then, does response-independence seem so evidently true? The projection mechanism of Chapter 8 (§3.4) supplies the diagnosis, which is discriminating. A mind constituted by directional responses cannot represent a value undirected,

since a value that counted for nothing against nothing would not present as a value at all. When it represents value at all, it therefore represents structure with the pull built in: a fact that beckons, an arithmetic that obliges. The realist's intuition is what a mind of our constitution would have whether or not response-independence were true, so it cannot discriminate his view from this one — and this one explains the intuition he must take as basic.

The diagnosis has a mirror, and the accounting should show it. A mind of directional responses would also find the trilemma's partition compelling whether or not the partition were sound, so the felt evidence on the framework's side is as little probative as the realist's seeming is on his. The asymmetry between the positions is carried elsewhere: by the production challenges of §§3.5 and 3.8, whose burden lies with the producer, and by the chain of §A.4, which a challenger must reject by name. What the projection diagnosis contributes is symmetric — an explanation of each side's conviction that leaves the argument to the arguments.

The result and its condition. The direction projection is established, conditional on the response-constitutive reading of orientation (§§3.1–3.2) and the compositional premises drawn from Chapters 2 and 7, the Chapter 7 premise in its exhibitive form throughout, which is established and which the trilemma uses at that grade.

A challenger must exhibit a favouring that is neither structural nor felt, or a concept that bottoms out in no registered contrast: production challenges, with the burden on the producer. What the trilemma does not do is compel the externalist content with an inert authority. It constrains the content of his putative fact rather than his motivational psychology, so that figure is placed rather than refuted, the residual disagreement being Williams's (1981) between internal and external reasons. The costing is completed at §A.1, while the premise itself is modelled and costed at §A.5.

3.6 The vacancy result

This section turns the trilemma into a result about meaning. The realist's defining clause — value independent of every response — marks no contrast by any route the account can locate, and a clause that marks no contrast says nothing; the result is established on one stated commitment, with the self-standing family (below) left as a tolled exit.

As deployed so far, the trilemma shows that the non-naturalist cannot characterise his favouring, since every characterisation lands in a cell that defeats him. The stronger conclusion concerns the clause doing his work, "value obtains independently of every response", which fails as a thesis in a more basic way than falsity: it is vacant. For the clause to be a thesis it must be a diff, standing distinguishable from its denial in the content-level sense Chapter 2 (§2.4) fixes. That sense is wider than modal contrast, since the mathematical contents earn their standing with their modal profiles idle.

One point of order governs the audit and should be stated before it runs. A label with no content behind it is not understood and then found wanting; it is not understood. What follows does not discover, on inspection, that the clause is empty. It records why the attempt to understand it never completes — why every explanation offered for the clause hands the hearer materials that lead back into the circle or out to a response — and, with §3.5, why the attempt seems to complete all the same. The first reply to the clause is accordingly not a refutation but a request: say what would differ if it held. The routes audit is the record of the answers, and the request is put to the account's own foundation before it is put to the realist (below), so that the standard applied is one the account has met.

The width is where the natural objection lodges: if necessary truths are contents without modal contrast, the clause might be another such content, modally silent and meaningful all the same. The answer is an audit of the routes. A content secures its standing in one of three ways, with the partition of §3.5 permitting no fourth: by a modal contrast between the worlds where it holds and the worlds where it fails; by a felt contrast; or by composition from registered constituents whose

structure supplies the grain, the route by which the necessary truths survive (Chapter 2, §2.4).

The clause fails on each. By the non-naturalist's own concession the favouring is inert, so no modal contrast obtains: the two classes of world coincide in every vector, gradient, and disposition. No felt contrast obtains, since a felt difference is a response and the clause quantifies responses away. The compositional route is the one the trilemma has closed, because the clause's distinguishing constituent is the favouring itself, and a constituent composed of no registered contrast — by the partition of §3.5 and the exhibitive closure of Chapter 7 — is not a content in waiting.

It is the empty overshoot, a label with nothing behind it, so the fine grain that rescues arithmetic cannot rescue a term with no materials for grain to arrange. The response-independence clause therefore says nothing: worlds "with" the inert favouring and worlds "without" it are one class of worlds under two noises, and no route a content can travel severs the clause from its denial.

A distinction stands between saying nothing and describing the impossible; the audit must respect it, because the realist's strongest reply lives in the gap. "There is a largest prime" describes a thing that provably cannot exist, while the sentence carries content enough to be proved false, since only a contentful sentence supports a proof. Its constituents are each in good standing, and constituents in good standing compose contentful wholes even where the whole describes nothing possible; the framework itself relies on this in saving the mathematical contents (Chapter 2, §2.4).

The realist claims the same standing for his clause. "Value", "independent", and "response" are each meaningful, so the clause, he concludes, is at worst a necessary falsehood — and a necessary falsehood would serve his opponents perfectly, since the error theory needs a contentful commitment that fails. The audit owes an account of the difference between the two cases, and of which side the clause occupies.

The anchoring requirement. The account runs through a norm the grid architecture already contains. Chapter 7 (§3) orders labels, grasped diffs, and real distinctions by containment: every label attaches to a grasped diff, an inclusion that does not reverse. Read as a norm, the containment says that a label carries no content beyond what registration supplies it. Chains of inter-defined labels transmit content from word to word; they cannot create it. A vocabulary circular at its base must therefore exit somewhere into a registered contrast, or the circle passes nothing around but itself. The reading is not a gloss the account chooses to put on the containment. A label, on Chapter 7's account, is a label of a grasped diff; a label attached to no grasped diff is not a label carrying little but no label, and a vocabulary whose every explanation is another such label has nothing among its members that is a label of anything. Call this the anchoring requirement.

The foundational vocabularies satisfy it, and locating each one's exit is what gives the requirement teeth. Arithmetic is circular at its base — "two" through "successor", "successor" through "number" — and no child learns "two" from the circle. She learns it from two apples, from the registered fact that here is a thing and there is another and they are not the same thing, a pre-symbolic registration of discrete difference on which the numerical concepts are built (Dehaene, 1997). The logical vocabulary is circular, "not" through "false" and back, and negation is grasped in refusal, the spoon pushed away, before any definition arrives. The framework's own ground is anchored the same way: "difference" admits no non-contrastive definition, and what anchors it is an occurrence (Chapter 1, §5.3).

The requirement yields the instrument the question calls for, and a familiar pair exhibits it. "Heat" has two exits from its circle. It is learned through felt warmth, and independently anchored in the physics — expansion, boiling, flow, measurement — a job description a congenitally numb student could master entire from the textbook, with no feeling anywhere in it. "Hot", in its felt sense, has the one exit only.

Subtract every response from the universe and the two words meet different fates. "Heat where nothing feels" keeps the second anchor and stays contentful, and true. "Something hot while nothing anywhere feels

anything" subtracts the word's whole anchoring. Subtraction, in general, has two possible outcomes, and the term's anchors decide between them. Where an anchor independent of the one subtracted survives, content remains standing and the impossible combination is a contradiction. Where the subtracted anchor was the term's only one, the subtraction withdraws the anchoring entire, and what remains is a label with nothing behind it.

Run the audit on "value". Every response-free explanation of the term substitutes a member of its own family — "good", "what one ought to pursue", "what there is reason to want", "what counts in favour" — and each member is explained by the others, around a circle with no exit of its own.

G. E. Moore (1903) ran this test, found "good" indefinable, and read the finding as the discovery of a primitive on the model of "yellow". The reading fails at the anchor. "Yellow" escapes its circle by ostension, where the pointing lands on registered chromatic contrast. Point instead at the rescue or at the cruelty, to exhibit the response-independent value there, and everything at the end of the finger decomposes without remainder into situational fact and felt pull: the first already claimed by physics and psychology, the second a response. The open-question regress and the failed ostension report a single finding twice over — the value-vocabulary has one exit, and the exit is valence.

The residue test. The instrument now separates the clause from the mathematical cases, a separation that deserves a name. "The largest prime" inherits its content from parts anchored separately, ordering from encountered comparison and primality from encountered division, so the combination arrives fully anchored and its impossibility appears as a clash between contents both present. A contradiction requires two anchored parties; "a married bachelor" has the same structure, each word learnable from its own examples, the collision appearing only in the combination.

The response-independence clause has the other structure. Its subtraction operator takes the central term's only anchor, and what the operation leaves is a label with its anchoring withdrawn: nothing on

either side for a contradiction to form between. Call this the residue test — subtraction yields contradiction where an independent anchor survives it, and vacancy where the anchor subtracted was the only one. Necessary falsity needs a residue, and the audit finds none. The clause is vacant.

The parallel will be pressed: “married bachelor” also negates one word’s anchor with the other, since a bachelor is registered as unmarried; it is a contradiction all the same. The reply is that “bachelor” is anchored in encountered persons and “married” in encountered marriages, two anchors, so the collision is between two anchored contents; the felt sense of “hot” has warmth as its whole anchor, and “nothing feels” withdraws that anchor, so no collision occurs. The clause therefore divides by what “value” is read as. Read as valence, the only content the audit finds for the word, “value obtains independently of every response” is a contradiction of the married-bachelor kind, contentful and necessarily false, and a commitment no discourse can be shown to carry (§A.3). Read as the third-cell favouring, a value that is neither the situational facts nor the pull, it is the item the residue test finds vacant; that is the reading the realist needs, since the first hands him the account.

Call this the vacancy result. It relocates the disagreement. The account does not deny what the robust realist asserts, because no assertion is there to deny.

Two anchors on offer. A realist who grants the requirement will claim that his vocabulary is anchored, and two anchors are on offer. The first is moral experience: the circle exits, he holds, into encounters with wrongness, as the numerical circle exits into encounters with distinctness.

Audit the encounter. What is registered when anyone meets a wrongness comes to two kinds of material — the facts of the situation, the knife and the screaming, and the felt against-ness, the recoil undergone — and the against-ness is a response. The anchor on offer is the second cell of §3.5, so a vocabulary anchored there has arrived at the present account by the back stair: the constitution of §3.2 with the

label changed, and the clause's own subtraction operator severing the vocabulary from the one floor found for it.

The second anchor is a faculty: rational intuition, the direct grasp invoked where definition and ostension have both failed. Ask what its deliverance is when it arrives. Either the intuition delivers a registration, and the trilemma re-forms at once around the registered contrast, structural and inert or felt and conceded; or it delivers a seeming, and a seeming of oughtness carried with force is valence under the description §3.5 diagnoses. The most careful form of the appeal holds that seemings confer justification on their own, without any anchor beneath them (Audi, 2004; Huemer, 2005). Grant it for what a seeming is. A seeming that is neither a registration nor a pull is the third cell, which is closed; a seeming that is one of the first two lands where the trilemma places it, and the justification it confers is the justification a registration or a pull confers. No third deliverable exists for it, by the derived tier of the two axes (Chapter 13, §2.3), which is the only tier the argument draws. That the trilemma reappears intact at the level of concept-grounding, having first run at the level of the fact, is evidence of what it tracks.

Why the exit cannot be opened from the realist's side either. The failure of every explanation to reach the favouring is not a limit of the hearer's grasp but a feature of the thing. Registration is differential causal response (Chapter 13, §2.1): a contrast is registered when it makes a difference to the system that registers it. The favouring, by the realist's own concession, makes none — inert in every vector, gradient, and disposition (§3.5). So no register can be anchored in it, whatever faculty is proposed to do the anchoring; the anchor the clause needs is one that nothing could supply. This is the reliability circle of §3.5 seen from the side of concept-grounding, and §A.5 shows the two to be one cost.

The mathematical parallel will be pressed at this point. Platonists hold that numbers are causally inert and that mathematical knowledge stands regardless, so a realist about value may claim the same licence, and the challenge has been put in this very form (Clarke-Doane, 2020). The residue test is what separates the cases. Nothing registers the number two; what is registered is two apples, and the concept is

composed from that registration (Chapter 2, §2.4). The platonist's inert objects sit at the top of a construction whose every part is anchored, and the epistemology of the top is the epistemology of the parts, however far the construction climbs — the point the inaccessible cardinal makes below. The favouring sits at the top of nothing. The challenge as pressed concerns safety rather than sensitivity — whether the beliefs could easily have been false — and safety is a property of beliefs that have a content; the audit is prior to it, since it asks whether there is a content for a belief to be safe about.

The self-standing family. The remaining move refuses the requirement. Normative concepts, on the most careful statement of the position, form a self-standing family: irreducibly circular, directly grasped, standing to definition as the logical and mathematical families stand (Parfit, 2011; Scanlon, 2014). The companions carry the position, and the anchoring requirement states their cost.

The mathematical circle exits into registered distinctness, the logical circle into registered exclusion, the framework's own difference-vocabulary into occurrence. At the floor, every foundational family is anchored. What the position proposes is a family holding its companions' standing while declining the anchoring each of them has — declining it by construction, since the one anchor its vocabulary demonstrably has is the anchor its defining clause forbids. A ring of labels anchoring one another, with no anchor anywhere in the ring, does not stand where arithmetic stands. The position is not thereby refuted. What it must hold, stated in full, is a concept with no exhibition and no composition, grasped by a faculty that would have to reach an inert property without being affected by it; and a concept that answers to nothing the account can register cannot be shown empty to one who reports grasping it, only costed. §A.4 records it so, as the second of the two exits the account leaves open, and states the cost.

Granting the exemption arguendo settles nothing behind it, because the epistemic cost falls due at once. A vocabulary anchored in nothing is a vocabulary whose use nothing regulates, so the reliability circle of §3.5 stands unclosed on the far side: the shaping of normative

conviction done by selection and culture throughout, the unanchored facts contributing nothing to it (Street, 2006).

The standing of the companion survey should be marked, on the division §A.4 applies to the field. The requirement is the containment of Chapter 7 (§3) read as a norm; it holds by derivation. That every foundational family is in fact anchored is a survey, defeasible by a family it has not met. A challenger who exhibits a vocabulary in good standing whose circle exits nowhere into registration corrects the survey and leaves the requirement standing, owing at the next step an account of what anchors the exhibit.

Two objections to the requirement. Two objections press the requirement itself, and both sharpen it. The first calls the apples and the spoon a genetic fallacy: how a concept is acquired does not fix what it is about, since “fish” was learned from ostensions that included whales, and its content outran every one of them.

The observation is correct and leaves the requirement standing, because the requirement makes no claim about learning. It restates the containment of Chapter 7 (§3), which holds at a time: a label carries no content beyond what registration supplies it, whenever the audit is run. The child cases locate the exits; they do not constitute them. “Fish” illustrates the difference, since its content outran its acquisition because the term stayed anchored — encounters with the kind continued to regulate its use, and the correction that expelled the whales was itself a registration doing the regulating. A content that outruns its acquisition is still anchored. What the requirement forbids is a vocabulary with no registration anywhere in its anchoring.

The requirement will also be read as a concept empiricism, and the strongest opponent of that family is Fodor, who argued that primitive concepts cannot be learned from encountered materials, since learning by hypothesis-testing already requires the concept whose acquisition it was to explain, and concluded that they are not learned at all, being acquired by a locking that no learning performs (Fodor, 1998). The argument bears on acquisition, which the requirement does not address; what it leaves untouched is anchoring. Fodor’s own account of content

is informational: a concept means what it is nomically locked to, the property whose instances cause its tokenings (Fodor, 1987), which is a registration relation in the vocabulary of Chapter 13 (§2.1), differential causal response under another description. An innate vehicle is therefore anchored by what it locks to, as a learned one is by what taught it, and a vehicle locked to a property that makes no difference to any register is locked to no property. The self-standing theorist cannot borrow the nativism, then, because what it would supply is a vehicle, and the vehicle for "counts in favour" would still need a property that covaries with its use — the property the vacancy result finds absent.

The second objection sends mathematics back across the lines. No one has registered an inaccessible cardinal; the concept lives inside a circle of set-theoretic symbols, fixed by axioms, with no exit of its own — an unanchored vocabulary in good standing, and a precedent the realist can claim.

The reply is the compositional route the audit has carried throughout. "Inaccessible cardinal" inherits its content from parts anchored separately: "set" and "membership" from encountered collection, ordering from encountered comparison, negation from lived exclusion, assembled by operations that are themselves anchored. The transfinite is the largest-prime structure extended — full anchoring from the floor, however far the construction climbs above it. Distance from the floor costs nothing, provided the floor is there; what the requirement forbids is a circle composed of nothing outside itself. The value-family has no anchored parts for composition to assemble, since its members are one another, so the mathematical precedent belongs to the route the trilemma closed for it at §3.5.

A child who has stacked two blocks on two blocks owns every part the transfinite will ever use: collection, order, the step from a pile to a bigger pile. The tower of alephs is that afternoon's inventory iterated without new acquisitions. The value-family arrives with an empty inventory and borrows only from itself. The asymmetry is a production challenge and no assertion: the scene for number can be pointed at, the child, the blocks, the second pair set on the first, and the self-standing theorist is asked for its counterpart, a scene in which "counts in favour"

is registered as a part is registered, from which the family could be composed. The trilemma (§3.5) says why none arrives; until one does, the precedent belongs to number alone.

The companion reversed. The family's precedent claim — that normative concepts stand as mathematical concepts stand (Parfit, 2011; Scanlon, 2014) — turns against it here. Begin from a single registered difference, a mark against no mark, and a mind can generate the whole of mathematics: a second mark, a row, a plane, a solid, the operations that combine and divide them, the symbols that name a quantity or a relation among them. Every part of mathematical content is composed from differences a mind registers; the one thing mathematics requires is that the first difference occur, with no object outside the differences needed for the content (Dehaene, 1997). Mathematics is therefore no companion in inertness. It is the paradigm of content built from registration; the family that claims it as precedent inherits the construction: name the difference from which "good" is composed. A structural difference hands the property to the naturalist (§A.1); the felt difference hands it to this account; a primitive difference that is neither has to be registered by something, which is the question §A.6 puts. The realist's own semantics concedes the felt half, since on the leading realist account of how the concept is possessed, to have OUGHT is to be disposed to intend what one judges one ought to do (Wedgwood, 2007), which places the pull in the possession and leaves the property as whatever the pull answers to — the accuracy question the anchor settles (§6.4), with no third thing to answer it. What remains is to hold that goodness lies outside every difference a mind can generate, and then to owe the connection between the intuition and its object that mathematics, generated from within, never owed. That cost the realist enters on his own account as the epistemological challenge (Enoch, 2011; Street, 2006): a property that does no work in fixing the word's content, reached by a faculty whose connection to it is unexplained, with no companion left in that predicament.

The verificationism charge. The vacancy result will be called verificationism: meaning tied to a test, the untestable dismissed, the empty clause the descendant of the meaningless sentence. The charge

deserves its full form, because the resemblance is real at the surface and the differences carry the argument. The verification principle, in the form Carnap (1932/1959) gave it, held that a sentence has meaning only where some possible observation would decide it; it fell to two objections: it excluded the universal laws of science, which no finite run of observation verifies; and it failed its own test, since no observation decides the principle.

The anchoring requirement differs on both counts. It ties content to contrastive composition, with confirmation playing no part in it: a content is a diff, one of two; a vocabulary keeps its content where its terms compose from registered contrasts, whether or not any observation could decide the sentences the vocabulary forms. That is why the sentences the principle excluded are kept whole. The principle's own defenders retreated from verification to confirmation in some degree; the requirement needs no such retreat, because composition from registered parts is a requirement a vocabulary meets or fails outright, with no degree to fix. A universal law relates registered kinds; the tower of alephs is composed from encountered collection and encountered order (the inaccessible cardinal, above); the largest prime and the married bachelor are contentful because their parts are anchored even where the wholes describe the impossible. Distance from the floor is no cost to a term while the floor is there. The requirement forbids one thing only, a circle of labels composed from no registered contrast, which is the shape the residue test finds in the response-independence clause and in no other vocabulary the audit has met.

Nor does the requirement license the inference from unreportable to empty. Chapter 6 (§4.1) declines that inference where it first arises, for the pure consciousness event; the requirement declines it here: a content available in kind to registration is anchored whether or not any report of it is ever made, which is the placement Chapter 13 (§5.2) gives feltness; a content composed from anchored parts is anchored however far it lies from any test. What the requirement asks of the response-independence clause is a contrast, by any of the three routes the audit runs; the clause supplies none.

The self-application test is passed; the passing is costed at its size. The requirement is itself a contrastive content: that a label carries no content beyond what registration supplies excludes its denial; the denial, once entertained, is a diff composed from registered parts, so the requirement survives the objection that destroyed the verification principle. Passing one's own test is short of self-vindication, though, and Chapter 2 (§2.4) is why: the thesis's denial is an existential, which one contrastive instance does not kill, so the floor the vacancy result inherits is established, at the tier the Register records; a realist who resists it must resist that floor by name, at the determination dilemma's cost. What the charge leaves the realist is the position §A.4 counts as the second tolled exit, the self-standing family, held at the cost stated there. Pressed as an objection to the requirement's form, the charge lands on the older principle and leaves the requirement standing.

The grounding reformulation. The second reformulation restates the clause as a grounding claim — value is grounded in no response — and observes that grounding claims are contentful without marking modal contrasts, as Chapter 4's are. The escape fails at the relata, since a grounding claim inherits its content from the terms it relates and Chapter 4's terms are independently gridded (Chapter 7, §2). Name the property this chapter identifies, and the claim is contentful and false, to be argued where the trilemma and the dissociations wait; name the response-independent favouring, and the relatum is the term §3.5 audited, contributing nothing for the claim to govern. The reformulation borrows grounding's hyperintensional respectability for the one relatum grounding cannot supply, and either reading returns the realist to a station already costed.

The request of the point of order above is now put to the account's own foundation, since the standard would be no standard if it were applied to the realist alone. One mimicry the foundation invites makes the test sharp. Chapter 3 (§3.5) grants the terminus a determinateness that marks no property-contrast — obtaining, existential and side-less — so the realist may claim the same standing for the favouring: an obtaining beyond every contrast, licensed wherever the framework licensed its own.

The difference lies at the anchor. The terminus's obtaining is secured retrospectively, from within diversity: the occurrence of actual difference establishes that the transition from equality is actual (Chapter 5, §2.5), and the occurrence premise of Chapter 1 (§5.3) anchors the whole claim from the registration side. The framework's one contrast-free obtaining is secured. The favouring has no occurrence for anything to secure retrospectively, since every registration in its vicinity belongs already to the situational facts or to the responses, so the standing it borrows arrives without the occurrence that secured the original.

The vacancy result is established on the routes audit and the residue test. Its floor is the anchoring requirement — the containment of Chapter 7 (§3) read from the hearer's side — together with one commitment the account states rather than derives and has applied to its own terminus before applying it here: that a content is what can be exhibited or composed, and that registration, being differential causal response, cannot be had of what makes no difference. A challenger has three lodging points. She may reject the floor, at the cost the determination dilemma sets (Chapter 2, §2.4). She may hold the self-standing family at the cost §A.4 states. Or she may meet the production challenge the residue test defines: a response-free exit from the value-vocabulary, an anchored remainder for "value" that survives the subtraction as the physics of heat survives the subtraction of warmth. Nothing of that shape is on record, and the open-question regress is the record of the search.

3.7 The containment result

The vacancy result supports a second, which reverses the account's apparent position on the field. Robust realism about value bundles four commitments: evaluative claims are truth-apt; some are true; their truth is independent of the observer's take; and their truth is independent of every mind whatsoever.

The account secures the first three outright. Evaluative claims state response-dependent facts and are true when the relevant properties obtain (§6.2). The moral case is anchored in the affected party's own registration, which obtains whatever any onlooker feels or fails to feel

(§6.4): observer-independence without mind-independence. The realist's strongest intuition — that her agony is bad whether or not any judge says so — is therefore true and is the account's: the badness is independent of the observer because it is constituted by the sufferer, so the intuition is evidence for the anchor and none for the clause, which adds "every" and deletes her. And error is real, since a response's content component can misregister its object (§6.4 on fittingness).

The fourth commitment is the response-independence clause, and §3.6 shows it vacant. The containment result follows: response-constitution contains every contentful commitment of robust realism, and what it declines is only the residue that says nothing. The account is therefore misdescribed as an anti-realism making concessions to realist intuitions. It is realism with the vacant clause removed — everything the realist can state, kept; the part he cannot state, returned to him.

Where the argument stands: the modality has been identified and its normative vocabulary fixed as accuracy-vocabulary (§2), the trilemma has sorted every possible favouring into three cells (§3.5), the vacancy result has emptied the third (§3.6), and the containment result has shown response-constitution keeping everything the realist can state (§3.7). Part two audits what the rest of the field can carry.

Part two, in the appendix: what the field will and will not carry (§§A.1–A.5). The naturalist absorbed, the realist's claimed advantage audited, the error theory dissolved, the field quarantined, and the premise beneath it all modelled and costed.

4 Three Forms of Goodness

With the field closed, the remaining work is internal: what forms the constitution takes. The taxonomy that follows divides goodness by the object of the constituting response, and everything the applied chapters use — the empathic identification of morality (Chapter 16), the two registers of criticism, the political derivation (Chapters 21–22) — is drawn from it.

4.1 Aesthetic goodness

Aesthetic goodness is the evaluative modality responding to the outputs of other sensory or representational modalities. When we perceive a sunset and find it beautiful, the visual modality constitutes chromatic and spatial differences; the evaluative modality responds with an oriented attraction. Beauty is an evaluative difference constituted by emotion in response to what vision constitutes. This is why aesthetic judgement is irreducibly emotional: one can describe a painting's composition in exhaustive technical detail without capturing its beauty — the description catalogues non-evaluative differences; beauty is the evaluative difference constituted in response to them.

4.2 Empathic goodness

Empathic goodness is the evaluative modality responding to the emotional states of others, or, in the self-empathic case, to one's own. The step is sharp. In aesthetic goodness, emotion responds to what is not emotion; in empathic goodness, emotion responds to emotion. This is a categorically different operation; it is why empathy is irreducible to cognitive perspective-taking.

One can know, in full cognitive detail, what another person is feeling without responding emotionally to that knowledge. The perspective-taker has orthotic access to the other's state, since she can check the description against the evidence, without empathic access. Empathy requires the evaluative modality to be engaged, and this engagement is what constitutes care, compassion, and moral concern. Like aesthetic response, it may be direct — tears, a smile — or indirect, the thought of what another may be feeling.

4.3 Orthotic goodness

Orthotic goodness, from Greek orthos, straight or correct, is goodness as conformity to a standard. A correctly spelled word, a valid argument, a compliant action: each matches a pre-established standard, and the matching can be checked without any affective response, since a spell-checker assesses orthotically without emotion.

Orthotic goodness confirms the modality argument by contrast. If all forms of goodness required the evaluative modality, the constitutive claim would be trivial. It is substantive because assessment, cognitive comparison against a standard, and evaluation, the constitution of oriented difference through response, are different operations. An emotional response may follow an orthotic judgement — a misspelt word may look unpleasant — and the response that follows is aesthetic: orthotic assessment provides the object, while aesthetic or empathic response provides the value.

4.4 Boundary cases

Two boundary cases fix the taxonomy's joints, and both are used by later chapters. *Disgust at injustice* seems empathic but is triggered by a conceptual recognition. The taxonomy identifies it as empathic evaluation mediated by cognitive content: the cognitive system identifies the injustice; the evaluative modality responds with oriented repulsion to the suffering the injustice produces. The mediation does not make the evaluation orthotic, because the felt wrongness is constituted by the response, not by the recognition of rule-violation. *Aesthetic appreciation of moral conduct*: a firefighter's rescue is morally admirable (empathic evaluation of the consequences for the stranger) and may also be aesthetically admirable (response to the act's form and grace). The two evaluations co-exist without collapsing, because they take different objects: remove the empathic component (the building was empty) and the moral evaluation lapses while the aesthetic one may survive. Chapter 16 (§2) turns this object-difference against the aesthete of cruelty.

5 Morality as Empathic Evaluation

The taxonomy generates a definition, developed and defended in Chapter 16: morality is empathic evaluation of behaviour that stems from sufficiently complex choice. Three conditions are jointly necessary. The behaviour must be chosen, since an asteroid that destroys a city is not morally evaluated. The choice must be sufficiently complex, since a dog that bites on instinct behaves badly but not

immorally; the complexity has its address on the output axis of Chapter 13 (§2.5), where the act must run through the alternatives and not by the instinctive route, in a field in which the affected party is registered as a subject. And the evaluation must be empathic — the modality responding to the emotional consequences of the conduct for others, rather than to its form (aesthetic) or its conformity (orthotic).

The response that makes such conduct good or bad is, in the first instance, the affected party's own: her registration of what is done to her, with the evaluator's empathy the modality by which that registration is read from outside, accurately or not (§6.4). The distinction between moral evaluation, which is empathic, and moral rule-following, which is orthotic assessment, is the chapter's most consequential result for ethics, and its systematic conflation by the major traditions is the subject of Chapter 16.

6 Objections and Replies

6.1 The rationalist objection

Objection. Reason can access evaluative difference without emotion: we can know that torturing innocents is wrong by rational reflection alone: applying principles, testing universalisability, calculating consequences.

Reply. The objection conflates two operations. Reason can determine that torture violates a principle, fails a test, or produces suboptimal consequences; these are orthotic assessments, and real cognitive achievements. What they do not do is constitute an evaluative difference: a system that checks behaviour against the categorical imperative without any response to the suffering involved registers conformity or non-conformity, and generates no oriented pull of moral concern. So Kantian principles are orthotic instruments, tools derived from prior emotional responses to suffering and flourishing, so their moral authority rests on the modality rather than on reason alone. The rationalist's report that he feels no pull while he judges is granted; §A.6 places the cold verdict as an anchored representation deployed while the

register rests, so the report supplies no third source for the direction the verdict carries.

Schroeder (2007) grounds reasons in desires, and the account supplies what that reduction leaves open: reason-sensitivity is grounded in the modality's oriented response, since a consideration that engages no evaluative response is motivationally inert, and a reason that moves no one is not functioning as a reason. The exchange ends, as §3.5 recorded, at the internal/external reasons divide (Williams, 1981; M. Smith, 1994). The trilemma constrains the content of the rationalist's putative response-independent fact rather than the psychology of the externalist who accepts an inert authority, and that figure is placed, at the cost itemised there.

6.2 The projectivism objection

Objection. Mackie (1977) and Blackburn (1993) agree that evaluative judgements are grounded in emotional responses while denying that the responses constitute real properties: values are projections of attitudes onto a world that contains none. If quasi-realism succeeds, the response-constitutive account adds only an unnecessary ontology.

Reply. The projectivist and the account agree on the psychology and divide on the ontology, and the division is settled by the trilemma rather than by analogy. The colour case supplies the picture: colours are constituted by visual systems responding to wavelengths (Hardin, 1988) and are not thereby unreal. The projectivist misdescribes this relationship as projection onto a world of bare wavelengths, whereas the visual system constitutes colour rather than projecting it. But the value argument depends on no verdict about colour, which is itself contested; the warrant is internal to value (§3.5).

What projectivism cannot do, and the account can, is distinguish a response that constitutes a real property, the empathic response to suffering, from one that merely occurs, habitual disgust at the unfamiliar. The distinction is drawn by fittingness (§6.4), and D'Arms and Jacobson (2000) articulate its shape: evaluative properties are

attributable to their objects rather than projected when the constituting response is fitting. Street's (2006) Darwinian debunking argument confirms the account's position from the flank it targets, since her dilemma bites theories on which attitudes track attitude-independent truths, and nothing here is tracked. The evolutionary shaping of the modality explains its calibration without threatening the reality of what it constitutes, as the evolutionary origin of colour vision explains which wavelengths are discriminated without making colours illusions.

6.3 The evolutionary and cultural objections

Objection. Emotions evolved for survival, not for evaluative truth; and emotional responses vary across cultures, so the account entails that values vary with them.

Reply. The evolutionary point answers a question about origin rather than constitution. Selection explains why organisms possess the modality, just as it explains why they possess colour vision, and shows neither category illusory (§6.2). The teleological version of the worry is answered at §2.2: the modality is individuated by its object rather than by its selection history; the object grades the implementation.

On variation: yes, evaluative differences obtain where responses obtain, and the same dish is really delightful in one context and really disgusting in another. Two things prevent collapse into relativism. The constitutive role is invariant, with only the calibration varying, shaped by development and culture. The moral case is anchored (§6.4): the fact that settles a moral evaluation is the affected party's registration, which cultural calibration on the evaluator's side can read accurately or miss, without creating it. Cross-cultural convergence on the core cases — cruelty to children, unprovoked violence (Schwartz, 2012) — is what the anchoring predicts. Where calibrations conflict, the mechanism of adjudication is deep persuasion (Chapter 21) rather than a further fact.

6.4 The fittingness objection

Objection. The account leans repeatedly on fittingness: a response constitutes a real evaluative property only when it is fitting (§6.2). But fittingness is a normative notion, and the wrong-kind-of-reasons

problem is that it cannot be grounded in the responses themselves without circularity. To call a response fitting because the modality delivers it is to say nothing; to call it fitting by a further standard is to smuggle in the stance-independence the account has rejected, or to start a regress of responses.

The objection bites hardest at the coherent outlier: a being whose empathic modality is intact but runs in reverse, so another's suffering attracts it. On the account, this being constitutes, for itself, the property that cruelty is good. If its response cannot be pronounced unfitting, the outlier cannot be pronounced mistaken, and the chapter's ethics helps itself to a standing it never earned.

Reply. The account cannot supply a stance-independent fittingness and should not pretend to. It does not need one, because the work fittingness was wanted for divides into two cases, and a single relocation settles the first outright and shrinks the second.

The relocation. Moral evaluation takes as its object the emotional consequences of conduct for others (§5). For moral value, then, the response that constitutes the evaluative difference is not in the first instance the evaluator's; it is the affected party's. Her suffering is her own modality registering what is done to her as bad: a response-dependent property that obtains independently of any onlooker. It is observer-independent without being mind-independent — remove her mind and the disvalue is gone, remove every onlooker and it remains.

The evaluator's empathy does not constitute this disvalue. It is the modality by which another registers it (§2.2), and, like any modality trained on a real feature, it can register accurately or fail to. This settles the cases the later chapters prosecute. The slaveholder's comfort is not a rival constitution of value standing level with the abolitionist's horror. It is a response that survives only by not taking up what is there, her suffering, already registered by her own modality; it does not become accurate because his society shares it, any more than a wall is red because a roomful of people view it under a red lamp. The verdict is not condemnation from our side but error: a response failing to register a real, response-dependent feature of its object.

The generalisation converts fittingness from an unexplained normative primitive into a structural notion the two axes already contain (Chapter 13, §2.3). Every evaluative response decomposes into two components. The content component is the registration of the object's features, assessable for accuracy without invoking any value. The orientation component is the valence coupled to it, which constitutes the value and, representing nothing, cannot be assessed for accuracy.

A response is fitting when its orientation is coupled to an accurate registration, and unfitting when the registration misrepresents: the phobic's fear registers a threat the aircraft does not pose; grief over a false report registers a loss that has not occurred; the slaveholder's comfort survives only by failing to register what is there. Nothing normative has been smuggled in, since accuracy is a representational notion and the account has been entitled to representation since Chapter 7.

The wrong-kind-of-reasons problem receives its answer from the same decomposition. The demon who threatens harm unless the saucer of mud is admired (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2004) supplies a reason to have the admiration while bearing not at all on what the admiration's content gets right. Reasons of the right kind bear on the accuracy of the content component; reasons of the wrong kind bear on the value of hosting the response. They belong to different axes rather than to different weights on one scale.

The floor of the regress. The regress has a floor. What corrects the sufferer's own response? An evaluator's empathy is a view taken on another's state, and a view can misrepresent; adaptive, distorted, and manipulated responses, on the evaluator's side and the sufferer's alike, are failures of just this kind, exposed by convergence and by intra-agent consistency (Chapter 15).

What is not a view taken on a further object is the sufferer's registration of her own occurrent suffering. There is no gap between the pain and its being felt as bad-for-her across which a misreading could open, since the registration is the undergoing of the state. Distortion can reach what she believes about her condition, her options, or her worth

— views, correctable as views — without reaching the badness of the suffering as it occurs. That occurrent badness is the anchor: the one response in the chain not itself read off anything further.

The clinical dissociations. The clinical dissociations raised against the floor confirm its placement. Pain asymbolia — nociception intact, suffering absent — is the two-axes architecture in clinical form: valence couples to content and can decouple, the floor is laid under the affective component alone, and where there is no suffering the anchor makes no claim.

The masochist is a composite of Chapter 15's kind. The pain's negative primary component is real and stays negative, since it is what the practice requires, while the total is carried positive by added value. Sought pain is badness outweighed, never pain registered as good.

Four further positions. Each presses on the floor, and one fork meets them all. Alexithymia (Taylor, Bagby, and Parker, 1997) and the unreliability of introspection (Schwitzgebel, 2008) drive a wedge between the felt badness in its occurrence and the subject's fallible reports of it, which is where the floor requires one, since it claimed authority for no judgement. The higher-order theorist (Rosenthal, 2005), taken as a rival account of feltness, is met at Chapter 13 (§3); taken arguendo he delivers less than the objection needs, since on his own terms the badness-for-her occurs, with the same reality, whether or not a first-order target exists. The evaluativist about pain (Bain, 2013), for whom unpleasantness is the pain's representing a bodily condition as bad, meets a fork on the represented badness: response-independent badness of the condition relocates the vacant clause (§3.6) into the body, while badness-for-the-creature is the valence axis under a representational description, so the position divides into a content component the floor never claimed and a badness component that is vacant or is the undergoing — absorbed on the pattern of §A.1. Klein's (2015) imperativism keeps the oriented component under another heading, since a command felt with no pull would be the inert entry the two-axes architecture excludes; and Corns's (2014) disunity would matter only if the anchor quantified over a kind, where it quantifies over episodes, each carrying its own valence and grounding its own fact.

What would breach the floor in every case is suffering that occurs while nothing is undergone, the item Chapter 13 (§2.3) challenges the critic to produce, and no case supplies it.

The real residue is the outlier who does not misread: who registers her suffering with full clarity and is drawn to it. Here the relocation does its second work. His attraction is his modality's response to her state, while the moral fact about her treatment is constituted by her response rather than his. His response constitutes, at most, that her suffering is good for him — a fact about his satisfaction, which says nothing about the consequences of his conduct for others; that is the whole of what moral evaluation concerns.

Asked the moral question — good or bad, reckoned by its effect on her? — the answer is settled by her; it is bad. The outlier who answers "good" has redescribed his self-interest as a verdict, or changed the subject.

What the account still cannot do is compel him. That his conduct is bad is a verdict he may grant and flout, and against his motivation, rather than his verdict, the account offers what the book offers everywhere: opposition, and where possible deep persuasion. This is a small residue, owned in the open. His verdict can be called mistaken and his self-description confused; only his will lies beyond reach, where, on every theory ever proposed, it always lay.

Both results on which this reply depends — the directedness of evaluative responses and the anchoring of moral disvalue in the affected party — follow from the two-axes architecture rather than resting on the dialectic alone. Valence is never free-standing: it is the orientation of a content, and contents have accuracy conditions (Chapter 2), so an oriented response inherits the answerability of the content it rides. Where the evaluation is empathic, its individuating object is the affected party's felt condition (§4.2), so answerability to that party is the constitutive accuracy condition of the response's own content rather than a courtesy appended to it.

The account's other wrong-kind instrument is complementary rather than duplicate. The route partition of Chapter 15 (§3.5) sends the

demon's reasons for admiring the saucer of mud down the consequential channel while admiration itself is constituted on the primary route. The present reply fixes which axis a fittingness verdict grades; the route reply fixes which channel a reason arrives by; and a wrong-kind case can fail on either.

6.5 The silent-harm objection

Objection. The account's anchor is the affected party's felt registration (§6.4); it is the account's answer to relativism. But there are wrongs, or apparent wrongs, in which registration is absent, and the anchor falls silent where a theory is most needed. Four cases fix the shape.

The undiscovered betrayal: a friend despises you, mocks you to others, reads what was private, for forty years, undetected; you die content, felt registration zero, yet the verdict of wrong is among the firmest the practice returns. Posthumous wrongs: the promise to the dying broken after the death, with the party registering nothing. The blissful violation: an agent covertly drugged into stable contentment while her commitments and relationships are taken over, her registration positive, so the anchor appears to bless the violation. And aggregation: one party's agony against a million inconveniences, where registrations exist but each is proprietary to its bearer, and no scale sums them. Fittingness (§6.4) polices the evaluator's reading of a registration that exists; none of these is a misreading. The anchor looks like a fair-weather instrument.

Reply. The resources are already in service, so the reply's work is to state canonically what the applications use piecemeal. The tests for adaptive preference (Chapter 15, §6.6) and manufactured added value (Chapter 15, §7.2), the fit criterion for purpose (Chapter 19, §6.3), and the manipulation audit (Chapter 21, §7.6) share one form: a response, or its object, is assessed against the party's own registration corrected only for accuracy and completeness about its object.

The informed-registration anchor. Stated as the account's second anchor: the moral fact about a party's treatment is fixed by her own

registration of it — actual where actual registration is accurate and complete, counterfactual where it is not, the counterfactual being her modality's return under full and accurate contact with what was done.

Its discipline is threefold, because every counterfactual is a step toward the ideal-observer standpoint the account forbids. One residue remains. "Accurate and complete registration of the object" is not a determinate specification: how much acquaintance counts as complete, and against whose description of the object, are questions the anchor does not settle from inside. So where a counterfactual registration decides, the anchor fixes where the moral fact lies, and fixes its content only as far as the completeness it invokes is itself determinate — settled in the easy cases, open in the hard ones. The correction is minimal: accuracy and completeness about the object of the treatment, with no further idealisation of sensibility or information. The modality is hers, so the counterfactual is indexed to the party's own evaluative constitution and no consensus, ideal responder, or theorist enters under the subjunctive; where her corrected modality does sustain a response, the verdict stands however unusual, as with the surviving grass-counter (Chapter 19, §6.3). And the counterfactual is diagnostic only: where actual registration is accurate and complete, it is the fact, and no would outranks an is that misses nothing.

The betrayed party first. What was done to her was the manufacture of a systematic misregistration: for forty years her trust and warmth were keyed to a friendship that was not there, her evaluative life run on fabricated inputs, so the occurrent anchor is silent because the silence was engineered, and an engineered silence is part of the fact — the manipulation analysis of Chapter 21 (§7.6) applied to a whole relationship, a stasis sustained by concealed registrations whose exposure would dissolve it. Her informed registration is what the concealment existed to prevent, and it returns the verdict of betrayal with full force: the wrong is the manufactured gap between her felt world and its objects, its magnitude the registration her own modality returns under accuracy.

One residue is owned. Where the illusion is perfect and permanent, the account locates the wrong in falsified registration, with no entry

under felt pain. A critic whose intuition demands felt harm is invited to press the intuition, which under pressure standardly resolves into the account's terms: asked why the undiscovered betrayal is bad, the practice answers that the friendship was not real.

The posthumous case divides, which is the anchor working. Where the party registered, while living, what would be done — she cared, occurrently and accurately, about her ashes or her word — the promise engaged registrations that occurred, so the breach falsifies them retrospectively: the betrayal structure, with the gap opened after registering has closed. Where living registrants remain, the ones who loved her and the participants whose registrations depend on the reliability of promising, their registrations carry the remainder.

Where neither obtains, the account returns a verdict on the promise-breaker and no patient-wrong, because there is no patient. Some of what the practice files under wronging the dead is, on this account, the projection of §3.5 in mourning dress, the empathic modality firing at a person-shaped absence: an intuition predicted and declined.

The blissful violation costs nothing once the discipline is applied, because it is the adaptive-preference structure with the adaptation administered by an agent. Run the audit: would her contentment survive accurate and complete registration of what was done — commitments overwritten, relationships selected, consent bypassed? It would not. The contentment lives on concealment as the adaptive preference lives on foreclosed alternatives, so the informed anchor returns the violation's badness in her own voice, the verdict recovered from her rather than imposed by a theorist. The case that looked like the anchor endorsing the violation shows why the anchor was always two-part, since an engineered registration is what the accuracy correction exists to see through.

Aggregation differs in kind, and the account answers with a location. Registrations are proprietary to their bearers, by the partition of §3.5 again, so there is no inter-register fact of the sum: no scale on which one party's agony and a million headaches are quantities of a common stuff. The refusal to sum has a classic statement in Taurek

(1977), reached there from the standpoint of each person's own loss, which no sum is a loss to; here it follows from the proprietary character of registration. The developed procedural answer is Scanlon's (1998): a principle is tested against each person's complaint, never against the sum, which is a rule for deciding where the registrations give no fact to read off, credited as such at Chapter 16 (§4.2). What exists is the several registrations, each real and anchored, together with the question of how conduct should answer to all of them at once — the constitutive question of the political layer (Chapter 15, §4.4; Chapters 21–22).

The utilitarian pressing the objection should be pressed back on his instrument. The sum is a construction, an orthotic device built to make registrations commensurable for decision, and mistaking the device for a discovered fact is the great moral conflation in quantitative dress (Chapter 16).

A closing note fixes the anchor's scope. It is indifferent to substrate: drawn at the level of registration, it inherits the ethereal mind argument (Chapter 18) and the standing criterion's phrasing, the capacity to feel counting wherever it is found (Chapter 22, §4.1). A simulated party's suffering, being undergone, is suffering, so a global simulation subtracts nothing from the verdicts above; where value lives if the world is simulated has one answer, where the feelers are.

7 Conclusion

If the argument of this chapter is correct, value is not discovered in the world like a fossil in rock. It is constituted by the modality's engagement with the world: as real as colour, as dependent on the responder, and as indispensable for navigating a world that would otherwise be evaluatively dark.

The chapter's results are tabulated below with their grades and rowed in the Register. Its defence against the field is the Appendix, where every stated rival is met, the two tolled exits are counted, and the one contested premise modelled and costed with the burden on the refuser.

The eight results that meet the field, mapped, with the section that states the cost of the premise each uses:

Result	**§**	**Grade**	**In one line**
Direction projection (trilemma)	3.5	established, conditional	A favouring is structural, felt, or nothing; only felt directs
Vacancy	3.6	established	“Independent of every response” says nothing
Containment	3.7	constructed	Realism kept entire, minus the clause that says nothing
Absorption	A.1	constructed	The naturalist holds this account under another name
Parity	A.2	established	Nothing anywhere binds the unmoved; absence here discriminates nothing
Commitment	A.3	established	The error theory’s alleged commitment was never available
Quarantine	A.4	established (negative half)	No contentful rival occupies the field; the survey is defeasible
The field and the pull	A.5	established, with a noted dependency	The premise the externalist refuses, modelled and costed; burden on the refuser

The support remains a braid rather than a chain. The trilemma is a conceptual elimination. The projection diagnosis is a debunking line that stands if the trilemma is resisted. The clinical dissociations (§6.4) are an empirical line: where valence is selectively removed, value vanishes with the response, which constitution predicts and tracking must treat as coincidence; where the register is silenced on the judge's side, the verdict survives on its anchoring while its motive fails and its edge cases drift (§A.6), which the same constitution predicts. The vacancy result is a semantic line that survives the contesting of every empirical strand. The informed-registration anchor (§6.5) extends the occurrent anchor to the silent harms under a stated discipline, its residues stated in the open, with the dumbfounding data sorted by the same instrument (§A.9).

Two registers of criticism follow, and both are used throughout what follows. The empathic verdict that conduct is wrong is anchored, in the moral case, in the affected party's own response, a real feature an evaluator's empathy can register accurately or miss. The orthotic judgement that it is incorrect is relative to a standard. No third, stance-independent register is available to any party. This distinction is what remains of the sentimentalist tradition's insight once it is given a metaphysics: where Hume (1751/1998), Blackburn (1993), and Prinz (2007) ground moral judgement in response, the present account grounds the response's category, its object, and its accuracy conditions.

Morality as empathic evaluation (constructed). Morality is empathic evaluation of behaviour stemming from sufficiently complex choice: an identification stated here and prosecuted in Chapter 16. It raises a prior question. Evaluation involves multiple responses firing simultaneously — to the object, its associations, its origins, its consequences. How are competing responses resolved, and what transforms a web of associations into a hierarchy of value from which choices flow? Chapter 15 develops the answer, which will prove essential for understanding how the major ethical traditions went wrong.

Grades and Dependencies

1. Grades. Nine results. The response-constitutive account of value is *constructed*, on category-individuation by modality (§2.1) and orientation as the evaluative mark (§3.1); it falls with the trilemma's second cell, since the eliminativist must exhibit suffering nothing undergoes. The direction projection, the trilemma, is *established*, on §§3.1–3.2 and the compositional premises of Chapters 2 and 7 in exhibitive form; what would break it is a favouring neither structural nor felt — a production challenge. The vacancy result is *established*, on the routes audit and the residue test, with the anchoring requirement from Chapter 7 (§3); its compositional route, the residue test, and the commitment result fall if the anchoring requirement is refused, at the cost the Register's contested-premises list states, while its modal and felt routes stand on the determination dilemma (Ch. 2, §2.4). The containment result is *constructed*, on §3.6 plus the four-commitment audit of robust realism, and falls with the vacancy result. The absorption result is *constructed*, on the naturalist fork (§A.1); what would refute it is a naturalist fact that is neither an oriented response nor an inert residue. The parity result is *established*, on one descriptive premise — that assent-compulsion is exhibited by nothing; what would refute it is an agent turned by a requirement while every response channel is flat. The commitment result is *established*, on §3.6 in its strong reading and the Chapter 7 biconditional; it requires strong contentlessness and falls on a weakened vacancy reading. The quarantine of the field is *established* as a partition and defeasible as a survey, on the Chapter 1 mechanism, the exhibitive closure of Chapter 7, and the partition of §3.5; a rival occupying no cell corrects the survey and leaves the partition standing. Morality as empathic evaluation is *constructed*, on the goodness taxonomy (§4), and is prosecuted at Chapter 16; it falls with the taxonomy or the moral identification. The aggregation limit (§6.5), that registrations do not sum, is a limit the account states, carried in the Register as the trade-off residue (Ch. 15, §4.4) beside the contested premises; no result falls with it, and every applied verdict on a conflict of registrations is read under it.

2. Chains and exits. The positive results are constructed; three negative results — direction projection, parity, commitment — are established, each on a chain with no constructed link; the vacancy result is established on the same path together with one commitment §3.6 states rather than derives

(content is what can be exhibited or composed; registration is differential causal response), applied to the account's own terminus before the realist's. The quarantine divides: the partition of possible locations is established by logical form, while the survey of actual occupants is defeasible by a position it has not met. Two exits stand outside the field at stated cost, the primitive-structure magnetist (§3.5) and the self-standing-circle intuitionist (§3.6). One premise is contested by name — that favouring is grip — modelled and costed at §A.5 and carried in the Premise Register with what falls and what stands if it is refused. The cold verdict (§A.6) is placed as a defeated objection and carries no row: it rests on the anchoring requirement (§3.6), the diagnosis of §3.5, and the model of §A.5, establishing no thesis. The anchoring requirement is stated with the results (§1) and defended against the verificationism charge at §3.6, with what a refuser keeps and loses listed at both places. The self-standing family's exit is costed at the epistemological challenge the realist enters on his own account, carried without the mathematical companion (§3.6).

3. **Instruments received and used.** The two axes and their exhaustiveness, at the derived tier, come from Chapter 13 (§2.3) and are used at the trilemma (§3.5) and the intuition audit (§3.6). The existence of valence as the orientation of a content comes from Chapter 13 (§2.3) and is used at §§3.1–3.2 and the anchor (§6.4). The exhibitive closure comes from Chapter 7 (§4.1) and is used at the third-cell closure (§3.5) and the vacancy audit (§3.6). The containment of labels by grasped diffs comes from Chapter 7 (§3) and is used at the anchoring requirement (§3.6). The contrastive individuation of content at fine grain comes from Chapter 2 (§2.4) and is used at the routes audit (§3.6) and the hyperintensional reply (§3.5). The projection mechanism comes from Chapter 8 (§3.4) and is used at the diagnosis of the realist's seeming (§3.5) and at the cold verdict (§A.6). The reply to the universality objection, run in reverse, comes from Chapter 20 (§5.2) and is used at the parity result (§A.2). The as-if loop comes from Damasio (1994) and is used at the tense of the cold verdict (§A.6). The possession account of OUGHT comes from Wedgwood (2007) and is used at the companion's reversal (§3.6), where the realist's own semantics places the pull in the possession of the concept. The Premise Register carries the chain, with the trade-off limit among the residues it records.

Appendix: The Quarantine of the Field

This appendix holds the account's defence against the field: the results that meet the stated rivals to response-constitution, each rowed in the Register at its own grade, and none of them used by the chapter's positive account except through the results named at §§3.5–3.7 and §6.4. Its sections are numbered A.1–A.9 and cited as §A.n. The table maps the field — each position the account meets, where it is met, the verdict, and what holding it costs — and the sections that follow are the arguments, in the order the chapter's exposition ran them: three results (§§A.1–A.3) that the quarantine (§A.4) assembles, two sections (§§A.5–A.6) that state the cost of the premise the quarantine uses, and three replies (§§A.7–A.9) to objections the quarantine sends to the account's own construction.

Position	**Met at**	**Verdict**	**What it costs to hold**
Non-naturalism (Parfit, Scanlon, Shafer-Landau): a favouring that is neither structure nor felt pull	§§3.5–3.6; §A.2	Placed	Clause vacant, reference unfixed, reliability circle unclosed, authority binding no one
The self-standing family: the intuitionist's circle of normative concepts	§3.6; §A.4	Tolled exit	A concept with no exhibition and no composition; a faculty that would reach an inert property; a use nothing regulates; the circle unclosed
Primitive-structure magnetism: reference without mediating content	§3.5; §A.4	Tolled exit	A primitive normative joint; the reliability circle unclosed

Position	**Met at**	**Verdict**	**What it costs to hold**
Constitutivism (Korsgaard): value conferred by the reflective structure of agency	§A.4	Placed	Endorsement that engages is valence, with the practical identity as its content; endorsement that only registers is the first cell, and shmagency is the demand for the pull it lacks
Naturalism (Cornell realism; "badness just is suffering")	§A.1	Absorbed	Restates the account, or posits an inert further property the trilemma has already costed
Quasi-realism (Blackburn, Gibbard)	§6.2; §A.4	Converged	The account's endpoint reached by a longer road, at the cost of one idle step
Creeping minimalism	§A.8	No purchase	The account's distinctness is ontological, so the collapse of the realist/anti-realist vocabulary leaves it untouched
Error theory and fictionalism (Mackie)	§A.3	Dissolved	The commitment the error requires is impossible; fictionalism inherits the dissolution
Eliminativism about valence	Ch. 13, §2.3; §A.7	Silent	Must exhibit suffering that occurs while nothing is undergone; a being without the responses issues no objection

Position	**Met at**	**Verdict**	**What it costs to hold**
Conceptual-role realism (Eklund)	§A.4	Placed	The role's only working occupant is the felt pull: the vocabulary kept, the realism gone in the naming
Argued quietism (Dworkin)	§3.7; §A.4	Contained	Receives the face value it wants — truth-aptness, truth, observer-independence — minus the clause that says nothing, which it cannot mourn
Strict quietism: refusal to engage	§A.4	Silent	No claim issued; invulnerability secured by having nothing to be vulnerable with
Moral dumbfounding (Haidt): verdicts without reasons	§A.9	Sorted	Sorted by the informed-registration anchor (§6.5): a registered party where there is one, an orthotic residue where there is none
Externalism about reasons: the contested premise that favouring is grip	§A.5; §A.6	Costed	The content of "must", and the reference, reliability and exit costs of §§3.5–3.6 (Register, Contested premises)

The verdicts are the chapter's own vocabulary: a position is placed when the partition of §3.5 assigns it a cell and the cell's costs fall due; costed when it survives at a stated cost; absorbed when it holds the account under another name; converged when it reaches the account's

endpoint by another road; dissolved when the commitment it convicts the discourse of was never available; contained when it receives what it wanted minus the clause that says nothing; a tolled exit when it survives the sorting unrefuted at a cost itemised where it is counted; without purchase when what it would erode is the account's ontology and no semantic construction; sorted when its cases divide by an instrument the account already holds; and silent when it issues no claim the account could meet.

A.1 The naturalist absorption

The trilemma's target has been the non-naturalist; a different realist survives it. For the naturalist (Railton, 1986), badness is no inert addition but an ordinary natural fact — badness just is suffering, as water is H_2O — with emotion as its fallible detector rather than its constituent. Her property causes tears, revolts, and therapy, so the inertness on which the trilemma and the vacancy result both turn gives no purchase on her. She must be met separately, and the meeting is a fork.

Ask what the identified fact is. If badness is suffering, look at what suffering is: not neutral tissue damage plus a value, but a felt state with the against-ness built in — negative valence bound to content, the directional difference of Chapter 13 under its ordinary name. The identification "badness = suffering" is therefore the identification "badness = an oriented response", which is the present account wearing a different jacket.

The naturalist has not located value outside the responses. She has located it in the affected party's response and declined the vocabulary, so on that reading the disagreement is verbal, since every fact, every verdict, and every mechanism is shared. This is the first horn; it is absorption rather than defeat: the anchoring of §6.4, the patient's registration as the fact the observer's response answers to, just is her view, correctly described.

If instead she insists that badness is something suffering has — a further property riding on the felt awfulness, present even where the

feeling is subtracted — the second horn opens. Subtract the feeling and audit what the residue does. The tears, the flinching, the revolutions are caused by the suffering-as-felt. The postulated extra causes nothing beyond what its bearer already causes, explains nothing its bearer does not explain, and marks no difference between worlds that share their feelings. It is the inert favouring of §3.5 relocated one level down, so the trilemma and the vacancy result apply to it unmodified.

The efficacious variant. A neighbouring figure declines the identity claim and the inertness concession together: value as a property that disposes desire (Oddie, 2005), or as normative and causally efficacious through the natural states that realise it (Wedgwood, 2007). Against him the vacancy result claims nothing, since his worlds differ by the causal route — the property causes responses its absence would not — so the meeting point is this fork, with one audit added.

Ask what does the causing. The felt state and its physical base cause the tears, the flinching, and the therapy on every party's accounting, so the question is what causal work remains for the value above its base. Locate the property in the oriented response, and the first horn has him: absorption, the account under another vocabulary. Posit productive work the base does not already do, and the position secures causal autonomy for a normative property — a cost the exclusion argument collects on (Kim, 1998), itself a contested instrument, deployed here with its status in view. The figure is placed and costed. His escape from vacancy is real, at a cost in causal metaphysics, and the reliability question of §3.5 — how the caused responses come to track the property over its base — follows him through the exit.

The explanatory-kind variant. A third figure declines both the identity claim and the residue. For the Cornell realists (Boyd, 1988; Brink, 1989; Sturgeon, 1985), a moral property is a natural kind individuated by its explanatory role — a homeostatic cluster of conditions that co-occur and explain, as "health" does, without being identical to any one of them or to the responses they provoke. The kind is neither suffering nor suffering plus a value; it is not obviously inert, since it is posited to explain. The fork meets it as it met the others. Either the cluster includes registrations among its members — the

suffering, the recoil, the reform — in which case the kind is constituted in part by responses and the anchor of §6.4 has it, absorbed; or the cluster excludes them, in which case what the kind is invoked to explain is explained by the registrations it excludes, leaving the kind idle over its base — the exclusion argument run above against the efficacious variant with a cluster in place of a property. What survives the fork is the naturalist's own instrument — explanation — applied to the responses that were doing the explaining all along.

The life-form variant. A limiting case exposes the fork cleanly. Let the naturalist widen her fact beyond feeling — goodness as flourishing, say, since flourishing does not obviously require sentience. Is the thriving of a weed good, in a universe containing no valence anywhere? If yes, "good" has been detached from every possible mattering and names only growth, a predicate even she does not want, since it makes the flourishing of a plague equally good. If no — if flourishing counts only where some creature can register its own flourishing — then feeling was the gate all along, and the first horn has her.

A third answer has the neo-Aristotelian tradition behind it and must be enumerated rather than absorbed silently. The weed's thriving is good relative to its life-form (Foot, 2001), indexed to what the oak or the wolf characteristically does: mind-independent yet not free-floating, so the plague generalisation is blocked by the index rather than by a gate.

The reply runs the index through §2.2. Ask what life-form-relative goodness consists in. If deviation from the form is bad for the organism in a sense that anywhere counts as some creature's registration — the wolf's hunger, the plant's nothing — then feeling was the gate after all, indexed rather than removed, and the first horn has her with one extra step. If it never counts so, if the standard is pure conformity of specimen to type, gradeable in a universe of zero registration, then it is the function-talk §2.2 dissected: grading against a type is orthotic assessment (§4.3), and "a good specimen" is good in the way a correctly spelled word is — description of conformity, constituting no value.

On that reading the thriving plague is a flawless specimen, and the tradition's own recoil from calling that goodness has always been the tacit appeal to what flourishing involves for the creature living it: the first horn, under its oldest name. Every naturalist realism, pressed to specify its fact, either is the response-constitutive account under another label or posits a residue the trilemma has already costed, with the life-form variant dividing between the first option and orthotic description under pressure of the same question.

The rival positions in the field are accordingly two, not three: the non-naturalist, placed at the cost §3.5 itemises, and the naturalist, absorbed — the life-form variant included, and the efficacious variant dividing between the absorption and the costed step above. The colour analogy, so often asked to carry the account, can now be relieved of argumentative duty. It remains the clearest available picture of a property that is response-dependent and real at once, while the warrant is the trilemma and the fork, both internal to value, neither owing anything to any verdict about colour.

A.2 The parity result

The results so far concern what a response-independent favouring would have to be. A different objection concerns what the present account fails to supply; it should be met before the field is closed, because it is the consideration a reader minded to retain realism will finally lean on. The account explains what value is; it delivers no requirement, no ought that reaches the agent whom nothing moves.

Confront the coherent outlier (§6.4): a being who registers the child's drowning with perfect accuracy and is unmoved. The account can say that the child's suffering is bad, anchored in her own registration, and that the outlier has misregistered nothing. It cannot say he is required to act in a sense that binds him independently of everything in him. Realism, the objection concludes, can — and a metaethics that cannot has explained morality's anatomy while amputating its authority.

The audit of the claimed advantage. The reply is an audit of the claimed advantage, and the audit returns nothing. Ask what the realist's requirement does when it reaches the unmoved agent. It does not restrain his hand, since no wrongdoer in the history of conduct has been halted by an ought-fact that engaged no response in him; restraint is the work of other agents' responses, of persuasion, and of the enforcement that codified responses license (Chapters 21–22). It does not enter his deliberation, since a consideration that engages no evaluative response is motivationally inert (§6.1). It does not even secure his assent, since assent is a response and he was stipulated to lack the relevant ones.

Nor is this the defect of one position. It is a structural fact about every position whatever: nothing compels assent anywhere. The book's own foundation is the limiting case, since the denial of difference instantiates difference (Chapter 1) and the denier can still say no — exhibited rather than converted. If self-vindication does not turn the resisting mind, no metaethical posit was going to.

Call this the parity result: the capacity to bind the unmoved belongs to no theory, fact, or foundation, so its absence here is the absence of something from everything, and discriminates between no positions. The logic is Chapter 20's reply to the universality objection (§5.2), run in reverse — a defect every position exhibits identically has become a condition, so an objection that charges it to one party has made an accounting error. The must the objector demands already exists in the account, in the political layer: where requirements do take hold of the unwilling, they do so as law, shared preferences codified through persuasion and backed by enforcement (Chapter 22, §5), reaching the unmoved agent through his circumstances — the only route any must has ever taken.

The objection has a second, factual form. A sophisticated realist concedes the audit — his requirement moves no one it does not move — and retreats to the fact alone: whatever anyone feels, it remains true that the outlier ought to act. The retreat surrenders the property the parity result audits and retains the clause the vacancy result empties: a requirement stripped of every engagement with any response is the inert favouring of §3.5 under a practical name, and §3.6 falls due unchanged.

The two results close as a pincer. Read the ought as gripping, and parity answers: nothing grips, the realist's included. Read it as idle, and vacancy answers: an idle ought says nothing. Grip and idleness partition the case by negation; there is no third reading.

What survives should be stated, because it is real and the account keeps it. The felt bindingness of moral requirement is a directional difference (Chapter 13), the pull of the empathic modality that the traditions misattribute to rule, procedure, or command (Chapter 16, §4.1), and for every agent who has it, morality obligates just as experienced. What the account declines is the projection of that pull into the facts (§3.5), where it would await even the agent who lacks it. The residue is §A.7's: a being altogether without the pull is silent, and from silence no objection issues, while the objector who demands to know why the silent being is nonetheless wrong exercises, in the demand, the orientation he imagines absent.

The parity result is established. It rests on one descriptive premise — assent-compulsion is exhibited by nothing — and the premise would be idle if whatever turned an agent were classified as a response by definition. The classification is empirical instead: a response is an engagement of the evaluative modality, carrying the marks this chapter has assigned it throughout — felt pull, behavioural orientation, physiological trace — each detectable independently of the conduct it explains.

The denier's counterexample accordingly has a stateable shape: an agent whose conduct or judgement alters upon presentation of the putative requirement while every such channel is shown flat, sanction and incentive included. Nothing of that shape is on record, so the premise stands as an empirical universal with its refutation condition open. The retreat position falls to §3.6. The outlier returns at §A.5, where he divides into the agent who is moved and outweighed and the agent who knows only the rule, and where the premise the objection rests on is modelled and costed.

A.3 The commitment result

The vacancy result was built against the robust realist. It has a second edge, so far unspent, and the error-theoretic tradition stands on the side it cuts. Mackie's (1977) argument from queerness runs: ordinary moral discourse is committed to objective prescriptivity, values in the fabric of the world binding independently of every response; no such properties exist; so ordinary moral claims are systematically false.

The second premise is this chapter's own §§3.5–3.6, reached by another route, so the tradition has treated error theory and response-constitution as neighbours divided by a verdict: agreed on the world, split on whether moral talk survives it. The contemporary statement sharpens the target without moving it, since Olson (2014) locates the error in a commitment to irreducibly normative favouring relations, which is the third cell named as such, and the commitment attributed is the vacant clause under its most careful description. The division is unavailable, because once the vacancy result holds the first premise cannot be formulated.

Why the first premise cannot be formulated. The first premise attributes the vacant clause to moral discourse as a truth-condition. A truth-condition is a contribution to content, a conjunct that narrows what a claim rules out, and by the biconditional of Chapter 7 (§2) a condition is the condition it is through the contrast it marks. The response-independence clause marks none (§3.6). A conjunct that excludes nothing adds no condition, so a clause that cannot narrow a content cannot figure among its truth-conditions. The other reading of the clause (§3.6) gives the error theorist a contentful commitment and takes away the attribution: read with "value" as valence, the clause says that a pull obtains with no body pulled, and moral discourse is no more committed to that than to married bachelors. The phenomenology he cites shows a direction projected into the facts (§3.5); it does not show speakers committed to the direction's subsisting unfelt, and the evidence that they are is his to produce.

The commitment Mackie's argument needs is therefore impossible rather than false: there was never a seat for the passenger. What "cruelty

is wrong" is answerable to is its contrastful remainder — the affected party's registration, the oriented responses, the facts §3.7 catalogued — and, so answerable, it is very often true. Call this the commitment result: the error theory keeps its second premise and loses its target. There is no error of the alleged kind for moral discourse to be committing, because there is no content of the alleged kind for it to be committed to.

One reply is strong and must be met. The error theorist can relocate the commitment from sentences to speakers: ordinary moralisers intend the objective prescriptivity, the phenomenology of demand confirms it, and a discourse whose users systematically intend the impossible is infected however clean its semantics.

But intending the vacant adds nothing to what is intended, for the reason that asserting it adds nothing to what is asserted: the will needs a content for its object, and §3.6 shows there is none. What the speaker has is the phenomenology, which §3.5 has already secured — the projection a mind of directional responses undergoes whether or not the clause it gestures at says anything. The error theorist reads the seeming as a commitment and convicts the discourse; the account reads it as a projection and convicts nothing, since a discourse is answerable to its contents and a seeming is no truth-condition. The choice between readings is closed, because the first requires the seeming to have a contentful object, and §3.6 stands between it and one.

Comparison with Streumer. The result should be measured against the strongest recent argument in the neighbourhood, because the two run in the same direction on different engines. Streumer (2017) argues that the error theory cannot be believed, since believing it would require believing that there is no reason to believe anything, which no believer can manage. His conclusion concerns the believer; the commitment result concerns the theory's target.

Streumer leaves the error theory standing and unbelievable, a position its defenders must inhabit without occupying. The commitment result takes the theory's first premise away: a discourse cannot be committed to a content that does not exist, so the attribution fails before

any verdict of falsity is reached, believed or not. The two are compatible, and their order matters. If the commitment result holds, Streumer's finding is a symptom under explanation — the theory resists belief because the commitment it attributes was never available to be the object of one.

Joyce's (2001) fictionalism inherits the fate at one remove. It prescribes retaining moral talk as useful pretence, and a pretence presupposes a defect: the literal content is false only if the vacant clause belongs to it, which the commitment result denies. Strip the clause and the fictionalist recommends pretending what is already true — assertion with stage directions. The utility he registered, the account keeps; the verdict of falsity that made the utility need a licence is removed.

The commitment result is established, inheriting §3.6 and the Chapter 7 biconditional and adding no premise of its own. A challenger must reopen §3.6 or reject the biconditional, which stands on the determination dilemma (Chapter 2, §2.4), which is where a rejection has to be lodged.

One dependency should be flagged, because it is unique to this result. The other results survive a weakened vacancy reading, since a critic who downgrades §3.6 from "says nothing" to "says nothing discernible" leaves the trilemma's costs and the containment accounting intact. The commitment result does not survive the downgrade: a clause that says something indiscernible could still be a truth-condition, and Mackie's attribution would be reformulable. This result alone requires strong contentlessness — the clause marks no contrast, not an inscrutable one — and the residue test of §3.6 supplies it, since a term whose only anchor the clause itself subtracts retains nothing to say indiscernibly. The Register entry records the dependency and its discharge. The result's yield is used at §A.4: both wings of the field needed the vacant clause, one to affirm and one to mourn, and the same argument retires both.

A.4 The quarantine of the field

Assembled, the results of §§3.5–3.7, A.1–A.3 support a claim none supports alone; it should be made explicitly, graded to its tier, and exposed to failure. The claim: every stated rival to response-constitution is placed, costed, absorbed, converged, dissolved, or silent, and the partition beneath it is exhaustive by derivation.

A position in the metaethics of value is individuated by where it locates the favouring value involves, and §3.5 established, by logical form, that a registered contrast is transferable (structure), proprietary and oriented (valence), or composed of no contrast (nothing). Every possible location is one of three cells; every actual position is a stance toward one of them; the field can be read off the partition.

The census by cell. The non-naturalist locates the favouring in the third cell and is placed: clause vacant, reference unfixed, reliability circular, authority binding no one (§§3.5–3.6, A.2). The cell's most careful occupants should be named rather than left to the type. Parfit's (2011) irreducibly normative facts, Scanlon's (2014) fundamental reasons, and Shafer-Landau's (2003) non-natural moral facts are third-cell claims whatever their differences, since each posits a favouring that is neither structure nor felt pull. Each meets the vacancy result at the clause and the reference argument at the hook.

The circle defence of the family's concepts, the self-standing normative vocabulary, is met at §3.6 and stands below as one of the two tolled exits. Scanlon's location of a reason's purchase in rational self-governance is met separately, at Chapter 16 (§3.1), where the seeing that governs is shown to carry the felt must or to move nothing. Gibbard's (1990) norm-expressivism lands where Blackburn's does and by the same route.

Korsgaard's (1996b) constitutivism needs its own line, since it declines the sort as stated: value is conferred by the reflective structure of agency, which is offered as neither a response nor a response-independent fact. Run the conferring through the partition. Either the reflective endorsement engages the agent — carries a felt must, is something it is like to undergo — and the second cell has it, with the

practical identity supplying the content the valence rides. Or it is the registration that a relation obtains, which is the first cell, and Enoch's (2006) shmagency question is the demand for the pull the registration lacks. The shmagency objection is met at §A.7 and counted among the batteries at §A.8; the constitutivism it targets is met here: the objection lands because the constitutivist has no third place to stand either.

The naturalist locates it in the second cell under other names and is absorbed (§A.1), the residue and life-form variants returning to the third cell. The quasi-realist declines to locate it and builds instead — attitudes stabilising into intersubjective, truth-apt discourse, an endpoint structurally identical to the account's, reached by a longer road at the cost of one idle step (§6.2). Creeping minimalism leaves the account untouched, because its distinctness is ontological (§A.8).

The error theorist and the fictionalist affirm the third cell in order to convict the discourse of it, and are dissolved (§A.3). The eliminativist denies the second cell and meets the production challenge of Chapter 13 (§2.3): he must exhibit suffering that occurs while nothing is undergone. If he argues instead, §A.7 meets him — a being altogether without the responses is silent, and from silence no objection issues.

Two engineered refusals. Two positions are engineered to refuse the sorting and must be met on their own construction. Conceptual-role realism (Eklund, 2017) is the reference relocation of §3.5 performed with finer tools: "good" names whatever property plays the action-guiding, deliberation-closing role the concept occupies in thought, so the role does the fixing and the property need only occupy it.

Run the role through the partition it was built to bypass. A role is a pattern of doings — guiding, closing, licensing — and an occupant qualifies by doing them. A structural item can occupy the role's third-person shadow, but a vector guides no deliberation and closes nothing. An inert occupant cannot be selected by a doing-role over the endless inert properties that fit the same shadow, which is the permutation problem Eklund himself presses, returned to sender. What does the guiding and closing is the felt pull in exercise (§A.7), since deliberation is closed for someone by something that moves her. Fill the role with its

only working occupant and the position has located value in the second cell: the vocabulary kept, the occupant named, the realism gone in the naming.

Quietism — the Wittgensteinian counsel, and Dworkin's (1996) argued version — holds that metaethics itself is the mistake: moral claims are to be taken at face value, and the question of what makes them true invites no answer above the moral level.

Against the argued version the containment result (§3.7) replies without combat. The face value quietism wants — truth-aptness, truth, independence of the observer's take, corrigibility — is what the account delivers item by item, with the vacant fourth clause the only subtraction. By his own lights he cannot mourn the subtraction of what says nothing. Argued quietism is the containment result practised without its accounting. Against strict refusal to engage, no argument is owed or possible: a position that declines to say what it locates where has issued no claim, and invulnerability of that kind is secured by having nothing to be vulnerable with.

The two tolled exits. Two exits stand outside the sorting, each at a stated cost, and the census closes by counting them. The primitive-structure magnetist (§3.5) secures reference without mediating content, at the cost of a primitive normative joint and the reliability circle unclosed. The self-standing-circle intuitionist (§3.6) secures his family's standing by declining the anchoring every companion family has, at the cost of a concept with no exhibition and no composition, a faculty that would reach an inert property unaffected by it, a vocabulary whose use nothing regulates, and the same circle unclosed behind it.

Neither exit holds a located content — one runs past content, the other declines its anchoring — so neither re-enters the field as a rival. Each survives as a position held at a stated cost, and each is a worked example of what remaining outside the field requires. The residue test states what either would produce to re-enter: an anchored remainder for the vocabulary, or a candidate content for the magnet to select.

What the quarantine grades. The enumeration is complete, and the grading must resist the inflation this is the moment for. It must also

mark what kind of claim each half is. That the three cells exhaust the possible locations of a favouring is established, by logical form, on a chain with no constructed link. That every position actually advanced occupies one of them is a survey, and a survey is defeasible by a position it has not met. A challenger who finds one corrects the enumeration and leaves the partition standing, owing, at the next step, the location the partition demands of it. That none currently does is reported rather than derived, where the report is the half that a better-read critic can improve.

What the quarantine establishes is negative: no contentful rival occupies the field. That result rests on a chain with no constructed link — Chapter 1's mechanism, the exhibitive closure of Chapter 7, the partition of §3.5 — together with the one commitment §3.6 states, so a challenger must reject a defended premise by name or refuse that commitment at its stated cost.

One such premise should be named here, because it is the one the externalist about reasons will reject: that a favouring which reaches no register, gripping nothing and marking no contrast anywhere, is no favouring (§3.5, §A.2). The externalist holds that reasons apply without bearing on any agent, and rejects it. The Register carries the rejection as a contested premise with its cost attached — the reliability circle of §3.5 unclosed, the reference route of §3.6 unanchored. §A.5 then states the premise as a model of "must" the externalist cannot refuse without paying for the word.

Everything positive remains constructed: that the second cell's occupant is the evaluative modality of Chapters 13–14, that feltness is availability (Chapter 13), that the moral species of the response is empathic (Chapter 16). Each has its own exposure, recorded in its own Register entry, and none is strengthened by the quarantine.

A reader may still refuse the account. She may take one of the two tolled exits, at the costs attached; she can no longer refuse it for a rival that has not met its cost. The refusal that remains below the exits is refusal of the chain, whose floor is the determination dilemma of

Chapter 2 (§2.4), where the cost of refusal is contents that cannot make any thought the thought it is.

What she holds afterwards is the residue §3.5 predicted: the report that the vacant clause seems meaningful to her, a seeming the account explains and cannot argue away, since arguments operate on the pulled. The residue is logged in the Register and the General Conclusion at its width — one account, two tolled exits, one report with no content located for it to be right about, and one named premise, that favouring is grip, whose rejection is the externalist's door. §A.5 stands on the far side of it.

A.5 The field and the pull

The premise just named — that a favouring which reaches no register is no favouring — is the one the externalist about reasons refuses. So far the refusal has been treated as a door: a named premise, a stated cost, and a reader free to walk through. That is correct as bookkeeping and incomplete as argument, since two parties who each refuse the other's first premise have not been adjudicated by either's naming it.

This section supplies the adjudication that is available. It does not compel the externalist; nothing in this dispute compels anyone. It shows three things: that the premise he refuses is one he uses everywhere else; that refusing it here costs him the content of his own vocabulary; and that what he buys with the refusal does no work. The shape is the burden asymmetry of Chapter 11, and the model that carries it is one both parties already accept.

The model. Gravity must pull. Take the "must" apart. The earth's field is present whether or not a body is in it; the pull is present only when a body is. "Must pull" means that wherever a body is placed, the pull follows. It never means that the field pulls when there is nothing to pull. Field without body is a shape: a structural fact, there to be discovered, and inert. Pull is field together with body.

"Field" here is the physicist's word, the region in which a body is pulled; it is distinct from the evaluative field of Chapter 15, the set of

pulls on one agent; where both are in play below, the second is called the evaluative field.

Now put a reason through the same model. The fact — the child is drowning, the dog is suffering — is the field, and the account grants that it is there whether or not anyone registers it; that is the anchor's observer-independence (§6.4). A register is a body: something in which a tendency can show up. The reason is the pull. One restriction keeps the model from proving too much: the bodies that reasons pull are registers of one kind, evaluative modalities, felt direction in the sense Chapter 13 fixes, and not every system with a directed response, or the thermostat would have reasons. With that restriction the model says what the premise said, in a vocabulary the externalist cannot disown — a reason for an agent is a pull on that agent, and a pull needs a body.

The classification. Ask what a reason would be that existed before any register. A circle drawn in sand is the letter "o" only inside an alphabet that gives the shape a role: a place among the other letters it contrasts with, a way of being read, a way of being written wrongly. Before alphabets it is a circle — present, round, and no letter, because there is nothing for it to be a letter in. A scribble that looks like a letter looks like one only to a reader who already has the alphabet.

So with the reason. Either it is a shape: a structural fact, there before any reader, where numbers also live, and primeness does not tell seven what to do. Or it is a role: a standing something has within the practice of being taken up, acted on, and got wrong, which needs the practice. The externalist's comparison of normative facts with mathematical ones lands his reason on the shape side, where nothing favours. What he wants is a circle that is already the letter before any alphabet exists, something that pre-exists every register and applies to someone. That is the third cell of §3.5, drawn so that its occupant can be seen.

The jobs. What the externalist hires response-independence to do can be listed, and the list checked against the anchor.

The job	How the account does it	Where
A person can be wrong about value	Her registration misreads, or reads, the affected party's	§6.4
A whole society can be wrong	The fact sits in the victims' registers, and the informed-registration anchor reaches victims whose own registration has been bent	§6.5
Moral views improve rather than merely change	Correction of registration	Chapter 16, §6.7
What the unmoved do is wrong	Settled in the victim's register	§6.4
The unmoved are criticisable	By the registers of those who respond to them as sources of harm, and by the rule	§6.4; Chapter 16

The one sentence left to the externalist is "he has a reason of his own not to". On the model it has five readings — the field, the rule, the sanction, a masked tendency in his own register that correction would release, and our criticism of him — and each is a job already done. A sixth reading, doing work none of the five does, has been sought and not found. The Register records the search as open, and the challenge as the externalist's to meet.

The outlier of §A.2 divides into two, and the division matters: the common case is the account's, and only the rare case is a commitment. In the common case the agent feels the pull, knows the act is wrong, and does it anyway, because anger, appetite, or fear pulls harder. The reason is a pull in his evaluative field, and it loses the resultant. That is what

Chapters 15 and 18 say about every choice — forces with direction and magnitude, a composition rule, the act following the strongest total — and it is what weakness of will has always looked like from inside. The externalist's "he knew and was unmoved" is false of this man. He was moved, and outweighed.

The two cases of the unmoved. The rare case is the agent with no empathic modality. He knows the act is wrong only as one knows a rule: people call it wrong, it is forbidden, it is punished. That is orthotic knowledge — correct classification under a standard with no registration beneath it — and the clinical literature has a phrase for it: the psychopath knows the words but not the music (Cleckley, 1941/1976; Johns & Quay, 1962). He holds the word "wrong" with its inferential connections and none of its content, the self-standing circle of §A.4 in the flesh.

For him the account says five things. His act is wrong, settled by the victim. The consideration against it is real, and inert for him. If he judges the act fine, he is mistaken about the standard's application. He is criticisable, and subject to the rule and its sanction. And he is not irrational; he is modality-reduced (Chapter 16, §5.2). The commitment is that last sentence; it is smaller than the objection made it sound: the reason is there, and inert for him, and the intuition that it still has hold of him is our pull, projected into a register that has none. A third figure, whose modality is intact yet at rest while he judges, is the common case; §A.6 places him.

The costs, unified. Three costs were charged to the third cell at §§3.5–3.6: reference unfixed, reliability circular, vocabulary unanchored. The model shows them to be one. A force is individuated by what it does to bodies: two forces that do nothing to anything are not two forces. It is detected by what it does to bodies: a force that moves nothing cannot be found out about. It is understood by what it does to bodies: "must" bottoms out in pulls, and a "must" that bottoms out nowhere has the word and not the content. A reason that pulls no body fails all three at once. The externalist's payments fail the same way. The pre-arranged harmony by which evolution is said to have tuned our responses to the facts (Enoch, 2011) needs the facts to have done

something for selection to track, which makes them a field with bodies in it. The companionship of mathematics places his relation on the shape side, where the successor function is individuated by its structural role and tells no one what to do.

Epistemic reasons. The sharpest form of the reply is that the account uses what it denies. There is a reason to believe what the evidence supports; it applies to the dogmatist who is not moved by evidence; and this book invokes such reasons each time it says a challenger must reject a premise by name (Cuneo, 2007).

Run the model. The evidence is the field; the truth-seeking register is the body; the reason to believe is the pull. The dogmatist's belief is incorrect, a structural fact about its fit with the evidence, and the dogmatist is unbound, since nothing in him takes the evidence up. Correctness is structural and bindingness felt. The book's own arguments stand under the same description: correct, if the premises hold, and binding on the reader they move. That is the parity result applied to the book itself (§A.2), and it exempts nothing.

Three last resorts. Three last resorts remain to the externalist, and each lands in a cell. The first is the world with no register in it: the last person destroys the forest, no one will ever know, and the externalist says "still wrong". The case is never judged from nowhere. Whoever says "still wrong" is a body in the field; the saying is the pull. Subtract every body, the judge included, and what remains is the field, which is there and favours nothing. The account keeps "idle" for a natural fact no one takes up and "vacant" for the normative item said to sit beside it.

The second is deliberation (Enoch, 2011, ch. 3). When an agent asks what she should do, she is not asking what she is pulled toward, which she already knows, so the question is said to presuppose an answer beyond her pulls. It presupposes an answer beyond her present pulls: the field she would have if it were enriched and informed (Chapter 15, §4.4), and the gap she feels is the gap between that field and this one.

The third is the question behind the question: why should she care about her own pulls at all? Caring about caring is a pull; the regress ends where the pulls end. There is no standpoint outside the field from

which the question is put, and the dissent that seems to come from outside is one more vector in it.

What the section delivers. The quarantine of §A.4 was stated with a premise the externalist refuses, and a refused premise is a standoff. The field and the pull convert the standoff into an asymmetry of the kind Chapter 11 charged the kalām. The account does every job on the list with no posit. The externalist's posit does no further job, has no body, and carries one unpaid account: the content of "must". And the one commitment the account makes — that the modality-reduced agent who knows only the rule is not irrational — is stated at its size and costs less than it sounded.

The externalist may still refuse the model. What he cannot do is refuse it for free, because the word he keeps is the word the model gave content to, so the burden of saying what else it could mean is his. That is the grade the quarantine carries: every rival placed and costed, with the burden on the refuser. One demand of his remains, and it belongs to the next chapter — that there be a fact about the hard trade-off, where two registrations conflict. Chapter 15 (§4.4) takes it up, taking the model with it.

A.6 Representation and registration

The two cases of the unmoved left the common case out. Between the agent who feels the pull and the agent who has never felt it stands a third, who has felt it, holds the verdict, yet at this moment feels no pull at all: the reasoner who says of torture, without a flicker, that it is wrong, reporting no emotion in the saying. He is the common case — every competent moral reasoner in a cool hour, the realist philosopher at his desk among them — so his report is the datum the realist's seeming rests on: apprehension with no affect in it. §3.5 explained why value presents as response-independent whenever it presents; it did not explain how a verdict can be held while no response occurs. This section supplies the mechanism, concedes the report whole, then shows that the concession costs the account no result.

The three cases. An agent stands to a moral verdict in one of three ways, sorted by the history of his register together with its present activity. In the first the verdict was never anchored: he holds the word with its inferential connections, having registered no pull beneath it at any time — the modality-reduced agent of §A.5, who knows the words but not the music. In the second the verdict was anchored while the register is now silent: a pull was registered, the direction it carried passed into a representation, the representation is deployed while the register rests. In the third the register is engaged as the verdict is made: the pull is undergone, the verdict its representation. The first case the model placed as the rare one, the third as the ordinary run of moral life. The second is where the realist stands when he reports seeing without feeling, so it is the case the account must place without denying the report or granting the seeing a third source.

The mechanism. The anchoring requirement fixes the direction of content between a label and a registration: labels transmit content, registration supplies it, the containment does not reverse (§3.6). What the requirement leaves open is the tense. Supply need not be simultaneous with transmission, since in the foundational vocabularies it never is: the child who learned “two” from two apples counts without apples for the rest of her life, the numeral carrying what the apples supplied, while no one infers from her cold arithmetic a second exit into a realm of number apprehended without counting. The evaluative case takes the same tense. A pull is registered — the suffering registers as bad, the toward or the away is undergone — whereupon the direction it carried enters a representation: “counts against”, “a reason not to”, “wrong”. The direction is a grasped diff; the label attaches to it as labels attach (Chapter 7, §3). Once attached, the label runs on its own connections. It enters inferences, is weighed, applied to new cases, taught, argued over, with the register at rest, since cold deployment is what a learned vocabulary is for. The alphabet of §A.5 supplies the picture. A reader who learned the letters by sounding them reads silently for the rest of her life, the letters keeping their roles unsounded because the roles were fixed when the sounding was: no silent reader without the sounded alphabet behind her, no sounding required once it is there. The tense is not peculiar to value. Affect of every kind is recalled as

representation, since the brain re-presents the body's response without re-running it — Damasio's (1994) as-if loop — so pain is remembered as the image of pain with the pain mostly gone, and terror as the picture of the moment; the cold verdict is the ordinary tense of any remembered feeling.

The seeming. This places the realist's report without disputing it. When he says that he feels no pull while seeing that torture is wrong, both halves are true. He feels no pull at the moment, since the register is silent; he holds the verdict, since the representation is intact. What the report does not contain is what he takes it to contain: a seeing whose direction came from somewhere other than a register. The direction in "wrong" — the against-ness §3.5 showed a favouring must carry — was supplied at the anchoring, sits in the representation as a grasped diff, so it is what the cold verdict manipulates. §3.5 diagnosed why the direction presents as the world's: a mind of directional responses cannot represent a value undirected. This section adds why it presents so at the moment the register is at rest — because the representation carries the direction whether or not the register is running, so silence in the register reads, from inside, as apprehension with no response in it. The realist reads the autonomy of the representation as the autonomy of what it represents. The two are distinct on the model as everywhere: holding the record of a pull is not being pulled, as holding the field equation is not falling. One feature of the report the realist counts as evidence remains to be placed: the force of the seeming, the assertive character with which an intellectual seeming presents its content and mere supposition lacks (Huemer, 2005). On the model the force is the residue. The as-if loop seldom runs cold, so the representation arrives with a trace of the pull it records; the trace is what makes the verdict feel like perception where the same sentence merely supposed does not. The first case is where the trace should be absent, which the stake below can carry.

What is not claimed. The placement is not a genealogy. That a concept was acquired through registration settles no question about what it can be true of; the realist who relocates his claim from characterisation to reference was met at §3.5 on other grounds, origin not among them. What the mechanism removes is narrower, while

sufficient for its purpose: the evidential weight of the cold report. The realist offered "I see it without feeling it" as a datum his opponent must explain away or else concede a third source. It is explained, on the account's own resources, with no third source, so the datum discriminates his view from this one no better than the seeming of §3.5 did. The refuting is done elsewhere, by the vacancy result on the clause with the trilemma on the favouring; this section leaves both where they were, taking from the realist one thing only — the phenomenology he had been counting as evidence.

The burden. The sixth-job search of §A.5 can now be put in the terms the realist prefers. Two things are present in any cold moral verdict: a representation, with the inferential connections of the vocabulary, plus the registration that anchored it, present as history where it is absent as occurrence. The realist needs a third — something in the apprehension that is neither the representation nor the anchoring registration, since the account already owns both. The Register keeps the search open with the sixth job, the burden on the same party: to exhibit, in a cold verdict, a component the two named components do not exhaust. The channel question puts the same demand in the realist's own terms. The apprehension is in symbols, the sentence "torture is wrong" in inner speech, with an image or a memory of what is judged beneath the symbols. Symbols carry content; an image carries no direction, since the picture of the child struck contains no "to be stopped" among its shapes. So the against-ness is supplied by the image, which cannot supply it, by the pull, or by a third channel that has yet to be named — and the clinic does not find one, since removing the affective contribution changes the verdicts while the symbols and the images stay intact (Koenigs et al., 2007). "Intellectual" names no channel; it names the symbols.

The clinical face. The three cases come apart in the clinic, where the account predicts how. Patients with acquired damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex — "acquired sociopathy" (Damasio, 1994) — keep their moral vocabulary, deliver normal verdicts on most moral questions, yet the affect that once accompanied those verdicts is blunted, so the verdicts no longer move them to act. Roskies (2003)

reads the population as a counterexample to internalism: judgement intact, motivation gone, so judgement is separable from motivation. On the account it is the second case under damage — representation anchored before the injury, register impaired since — so the account expects the retained verdicts to fail where a fresh registration would ordinarily have decided the case. That is what the data show: patients of the same kind give abnormally 'utilitarian' verdicts on the high-conflict personal dilemmas, where the aversive pull normally settles the matter, with normal verdicts elsewhere (Koenigs et al., 2007). The developmental case differs as the first case should: where anchoring never occurred the moral/conventional distinction itself is impaired (Blair, 1995), the vocabulary learned with no diff beneath it, the words without the music. Kennett and Fine (2008) defend internalism against Roskies by questioning whether the patients' verdicts are moral judgements in more than an inverted-commas sense; the account needs no such denial. The verdicts are competent representations; what they lack is a running register, which the account had already separated from them.

The stake. Stated plainly, the two populations should diverge on a test the chapter specifies and none has run as such — matched for vocabulary competence, the developmental case and the acquired case compared on the moral/conventional distinction, on the sensitivity of their verdicts to the affected party, and on the force with which the verdicts are held. The account predicts the acquired case ahead on all three. Convergence, the developmental case reaching the acquired case's competence with no history of registration, would break the placement; the Register carries it among the empirical stakes.

What the section delivers. A placement rather than a result. The cold verdict is the second case, its direction supplied at anchoring and carried by the representation; the realist's report is conceded whole, explained with no third source; the sixth job is restated in his terms and left with him; the clinical dissociations of §6.4, which laid the floor under the sufferer, are joined by a dissociation on the judge's side, which the account predicts where tracking must treat it as coincidence.

The grade is that of a defeated objection. It establishes no thesis, adds no row, and leaves the load where §3.6 and §A.4 carry it.

Where the argument stands: value has been located in the second cell and the field quarantined (§A.4), with the premise beneath the quarantine modelled and costed against the externalist (§A.5), with the cold verdict placed as the second of three cases (§A.6). What remains are three objections the account's own construction invites (§§A.7–A.9).

A.7 The self-application objection

The objection is that the account universalises: all value is response-constituted. The value of believing what is true is then response-constituted too, and with it the force of this book's own arguments, including the arguments for this account. When the chapter concludes that a reader ought to accept the trilemma's result, that "ought" is, by the account's own lights, a felt pull rather than a binding fact, so a reader unmoved by it has, on the account's own showing, made no mistake that obtains apart from someone's response. The framework appears to saw off the branch it argues from.

In reply, the account accepts the description and denies that it is a wound. Two things must be separated, as this chapter separated them for moral verdicts: the correctness of a derivation and the force of its conclusion.

Correctness is structural. A derivation is valid or invalid in virtue of contrastive relations among contents (Chapter 7, §2), obtaining whether or not anyone is pulled by it — response-independent in the only sense the objection needs, which is all the Register's "established" gradings record. What is response-constituted is the force: the pull toward believing what follows, the mattering of getting it right. That pull is an evaluative response like any other, an alethic orientation, valence coupled to registrations of accuracy and error.

But this particular response occupies the dialectical position the diff occupied in Chapter 1: it cannot be disputed without being deployed. The objector who argues that the book's conclusions do not bind him is

arguing — advancing considerations because they are correct, expecting them to be weighed because getting it right matters — so every move in the dispute exercises the alethic pull whose authority the dispute denies.

The force of the book's arguments is therefore response-constituted and inescapable for any participant in argument. Not because the framework compels the orientation, since consistent with §3.5 it obliges no one, but because entering the practice of argument just is deploying it. A being altogether without the alethic pull is not refuted; he is silent, and from silence no objection issues. The self-application is accordingly the epistemological twin of Chapter 1's self-vindication rather than an embarrassment: there, the denial of difference instantiated difference; here, the dispute of alethic force exercises it. What the account gives up — a bindingness that would reach even the silent — is something no theory has ever had and argument has never needed.

The objection has a general form, pressed as a companions-in-guilt argument for realism (Cuneo, 2007). Epistemic normativity — that one ought to believe what the evidence supports — is categorical if anything is, so a metaethic that states the cost of response-independent moral requirements must state the cost of epistemic ones identically, and the cost there looks unpayable, since inquiry itself would be forfeit. The account meets it with the resource just displayed, and inquiry stands.

Epistemic assessment divides as moral assessment divided (§4.3). The orthotic component — a belief's conformity to its evidence, a derivation's validity — is structural, obtains whatever anyone feels, and of itself requires nothing. The binding component — the pull toward the supported conclusion, the mattering of accuracy — is the alethic orientation named above, valence coupled to registrations of accuracy and error, present in every inquirer who cares whether she is right.

The companions argument shows the two domains stand or fall together, and the account agrees: both fall the same way, into an orthotic layer that classifies and a felt layer that binds, with no third ingredient in either. The guilt is shared and the guilt is costed. The epistemic ought that would await the inquirer whom accuracy leaves cold is the parity result's subject (§A.2) under an epistemic name, while the practice of

inquiry — assertion, correction, retraction — draws on registrations and responses, never on it.

A.8 The standard batteries

The account should close by passing the tests that have organised the metaethical field. The Frege–Geach problem (Geach, 1965) does not arise, because the account is descriptivist. “Cruelty is wrong” states a response-dependent fact (§6.2), so embedding, negation, and inference are the ordinary logic of statements.

Moral twin earth (Horgan & Timmons, 1991) defeats synthetic naturalism by imagining communities whose term “good” tracks different natural properties while their disagreement remains real. Here the shared subject matter is structural: oriented responses, the moral instances anchored in affected parties’ registrations (§6.4). The dispute is therefore over the calibration of one modality with one constitutive role — real disagreement without a shared natural referent, the profile §A.1 predicts.

Creeping minimalism (Dreier, 2004) erodes positions whose realist idioms are earned by construction; nothing here is earned by construction. The truth of “her suffering is bad” is the obtaining of a response-dependent fact, located in her. The position is distinguished from expressivism by its ontology and from robust realism by the vacancy result (§3.6). Street’s (2006) Darwinian dilemma finds no target, since nothing is tracked (§6.2). Enoch’s (2006) shmagency objection is met at §A.7: the only escape from constitutivism about content is silence.

Each test named a structural defect — embedding, reference, distinctness, tracking, escape — and the account passes each because the defect’s site does not exist in its architecture. A framework should be permitted one sentence of comparison after such a run: no existing programme both grounds its semantics in a foundation established by forced choice and passes the battery whole. The conjunction, more than any single result, is the account’s claim on the field.

A.9 The dumbfounding objection

The objection is that moral dumbfounding (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Koller, and Dias, 1993) appears to show that moral judgement is driven by responses the account itself must call unfitting. Subjects confront scenarios engineered to be harmless — the family that eats its dog after the dog is killed by a car, consensual and consequence-free taboo violations — and maintain the verdict of wrongness while conceding, under probing, that they can locate no harm.

If moral evaluation were empathic response answerable to an affected party's registration, the verdicts should extinguish when the registration is stipulated away. They persist. The data suggest the judgements are post-hoc rationalisations of calibrated aversions, which is Haidt's own reading, so an account that identifies morality with empathic evaluation inherits a practice run, on the evidence, by something else.

In reply, the account predicts the data, and predicts their internal structure, which the rationalisation reading flattens. Dumbfounded verdicts divide, and the division tracks the account's own instruments.

Some persist because the stipulated harmlessness is not believed, and should not be, since the scenarios stipulate away the silent harms §6.5 anchors. The dog case is the clearest: what subjects cannot articulate but will not surrender is that the family's relation to the dog — trust given, dependence accepted — is falsified by the meal, a betrayal structure with the registering party conveniently dead. The verdict is the informed-registration anchor working faster than the subject's theory of it. Other verdicts persist because they were never empathic at all: orthotic residue, conformity-responses to a violated standard, misread as moral verdicts by the conflation Chapter 16 diagnoses in the traditions.

The two components carry a sorting signature the account states in advance: sensitivity to relational facts. Vary the betrayal — the dog died wild and unowned, the promise was released, the party did consent with full contact — and the anchored component tracks the variation,

weakening as the relational fact weakens, while the orthotic residue is insensitive, firing on the category however the relations are set.

The manipulation data point the same way, since verdicts shift when concealed relational facts are exposed, while the diachronic asymmetry of §6.5 is the signature run over time: verdicts on the dead thin toward the promise-breaker as living registrations recede, which anchoring predicts and a flat aversion would not. What dumbfounding shows is that the modality outruns the subject's articulacy — which the account affirms, since the anchor is a registration rather than an argument — and that a portion of the practice is orthotic conformity mistaken for evaluation, which is not an objection to the account but its thesis about the traditions, returned as data.

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