APPENDIX C

# The Grids of Analytic Philosophy: Fission, Projection, and Escape

A word turns up from ordinary speech carrying one syllable's worth of confidence. "Is", "means", "knows", "true", "possible", "vague". It leaves philosophy as two or three technical terms. Edmund Gettier pried "knows" apart at a seam. Saul Kripke divided "necessary truth" three ways. The tradition treats the splitting as simply what analysis is.

This appendix treats the splitting as data to be explained. Why does analysis take that shape? Why do the muddles calling for it arise where they do? The answer offered is that philosophical analysis is grid-repair.

The grids come from Chapter 7, and they are three sets. The first holds all real distinctions, whether any mind notices them or not. The second holds all differences some mind has grasped. The third holds all labels attached to grasped differences. Each sits inside the one before it, because every label names a grasp and every grasp answers to a real distinction. Neither containment runs backwards: reality outruns what minds register, and registering outruns naming.

Chapter 7 adds that nothing meaningful stands outside the three sets. Exhibiting a counterexample means grasping a contrast and naming it. So the counterexample arrives already inside. The appendix borrows that apparatus and introduces no new structural premise. What it adds is a story about causes: why the damage happens, where it gathers, and which way it runs.

## One word, three faces

An everyday word is a label tied to a cluster of differences. Ordinary speech has no reason to keep that cluster tidy. Language is built for coordination, which tolerates mixed addresses. A villager knows where the well is, believes truly where it is, and can say where it is. Those three never come apart in the village, so one word serves.

The trouble starts when the faces separate. Gettier built cases where the believer has good reasons and the truth arrives by luck. Then two philosophers can use one word, each keyed to a different face. They seem to disagree while making two compatible claims. The label's pretence that the addresses coincide is what fails.

The appendix marks two kinds of fault line. A word can straddle the sets, and the repair is then a split across them. Its finished form gives one term to each set. Or a word can hold two occupants of a single set, as "infinity" holds two conditions of reality under one name. The repair is then a split inside one set, giving each occupant its own address. Either way, the sets supply the addresses.

## Why the errors cluster where they do

The bundles form for a reason inherited from Chapter 8. A mind made of distinctions cannot picture what outruns its own registrations. Where it must represent such a thing anyway, it reaches for the nearest registrable stand-in and paints that in. The appendix generalises that mechanism.

Two families of error follow. The first paints features of one set into another. In ethics, Chapter 14 argues that evaluative registrations arrive as felt pulls. A mind unable to picture value without a direction paints the pull into the facts, and gets the picture of a world that favours things. The second family legislates one set into another, as verificationism cut reality down to what could be checked.

The mechanism also predicts where the muddles fall. They should gather where reality outruns registration: value, modality, consciousness, the terminus. Illicit traffic should mostly run upward, from the smaller set into the larger. Read as a record of error, the history of philosophy fits both the clustering and the direction. The appendix's gallery is no distribution of cases, so the clustering stands as a prediction. Nobody has yet organised the record to test it.

Read as rules, the containments become traffic law: an upward move across the sets needs a licence. That you cannot conceive something does not make it impossible.

## The record, and Kripke's three-way split

The evidence is the discipline's highlight reel. Gottlob Frege split "is" three ways. He then split "means" (1892) into a real object and a mode of presentation.

The centrepiece is Kripke. Before Naming and Necessity (1980), "necessary" and "a priori" were treated as coextensive, and the empiricists ran "analytic" in with both. Kripke split the bundle three ways: how reality is across possibilities, how a truth can be known, and what the words guarantee. That is one term per set. That water is $H_2O$ is necessary, yet it had to be found out by experiment. A debate reaches that form in stages. The first split separates two faces, and later pressure locates the third.

The framework adds two questions Kripke did not pose. Why had the bundle formed? Because modal reality outruns registration, so it had been imaged through its epistemic access for two centuries. And why has nothing split off from the three since? On this reading there is no fourth set to add.

## The book's own splits, and the test they yield

The appendix describes no method the book does not use. Chapter 2 divides the everyday word "content" into bare structural difference and content a mind holds, which is a split across the sets.

Most of the book's other splits fall inside one set. Infinite diversity and infinite equality are both conditions of reality, two occupants under one name, and Chapter 8 gives each its own address. Infinite equality outruns registration, so minds imaged it through its partner, and the projection story explains how the fusion held for millennia.

The mechanism yields a usable instrument, the three-address test. For any contested term, ask what real distinction it answers to, what mode of grasp it names, and what work its label does. Where the parties return different answers, the standoff dissolves into component questions, each as real as it ever was.

Philosophy has also tried the opposite manoeuvre, coining terms meant to escape the sets. Kant's noumenon is one, used positively. Derrida's différance is the most engineered. Each turns out to be an operation inside the set of labels, wearing exit clothing. The verdict ends generously: such coinages fail as exits and succeed as maps, since each marks a point where saying anything strains.

## The objections the appendix answers

One objection is that all of this is trivial. That how things are, how they are known, and how they are said come apart is an ancient observation. If the thesis is that the three should not be confused, it has dressed a beginner's maxim in the book's notation.

The reply concedes the maxim and denies the appendix claims it. The architecture is a set of contested theses wearing the maxim's clothes. That every grasp answers to a real distinction is rejected by every idealism worth the name. That conceivability does not by itself deliver possibility is rejected by the modal rationalists, whose machinery exists to certify that very move. The mechanism then explains what the maxim cannot. The best practitioners break the rule repeatedly, in the same regions, in the same direction, while fully possessing it. Kripke's split was received as a revolution, which a reminder never is.

Conceptual engineering is the project of improving concepts, and Herman Cappelen concluded that meaning change lies largely beyond anyone's control. The appendix sharpens that pessimism. Where the fault is a projection, the bad usage is an output of the representing machinery, regenerated as fast as it is legislated away.

Placing a term is not absorbing a system, and locating Kant's noumenon does not refute transcendental idealism. The questions inside each set are most of philosophy. The sets settle muddles between the sets, and they answer none of the questions inside them. Rivals to the whole reading are named too, among them Timothy Williamson's view that philosophical questions are seldom about words or concepts at all.

## What the appendix claims

The appendix has no row of its own in the book's Premise Register, and the apparatus it borrows keeps the grades Chapter 7 gave it. The link between meaning and difference, the three nested sets, and the closure are all *established*. That is the rung below the book's top mark, and it means a challenger must reject a premise the book defends. The closure carries a note on its grade: its mechanism defeats every counterexample offered, which is *self-vindicating* behaviour. Yet the result is held at the tier of Chapter 2's thesis, through which that mechanism runs. The three sets carry a condition of their own. Every label must answer to something a mind has grasped, and that rule is the anchoring requirement Chapter 14 uses.

The reading of analytic method as grid-repair is *constructed*. That is the best available account of a real pattern, argued through cases, with live rivals remaining. The wider organisational programme is *proposed*, an explicitly revisable offer. The appendix names three findings that would count against it. One would show a mature debate settling without drifting toward one term per set. That finding must be read strictly, since the two kinds of split let the reading file any split two ways. Only new terms that fit neither kind would count. Another would show muddles gathering where reality does not outrun registration.

The Premise Register itself is placed at the end, read as a procedure anyone could run on any system. Graded as a method claim, the procedure is *constructed*, the best available instrument for the job. The wager behind it is *proposed*: that philosophy's shortfall lies in missing structure for arguments to accumulate in, and only derivatively in the arguments. A register manufactures no convergence. It changes what disagreement is, since each entry shows a reader the premise she must reject. The Register itself follows the appendices, carrying the rows the appendix borrows.