APPENDIX C

The Grids of Analytic Philosophy: Fission, Projection, and Escape

1 Introduction

Analytic philosophy has a characteristic shape, visible across its founding episodes. A word arrives from ordinary language carrying one syllable's worth of confidence — "is", "means", "knows", "true", "possible", "vague" — and leaves the analysis as two or three technical terms, each doing a portion of the work the folk word did entire.

Frege split "is" into predication, identity, and existence, and split meaning into sense and reference. Gettier pried "knows" apart at the seam between the believer's warrant and the world's cooperation. Kripke divided "necessary truth" three ways. The vagueness debate, the truth debate, and the modality debate each stabilised only when the single contested word had been replaced by a small family of successors. The pattern is so familiar that the tradition treats it as method: this is simply what analysis is.

This appendix treats the pattern as data. Its question is why analysis takes this form. Why do the conflations that call for it recur where they recur? Why do the repairs that resolve them split the way they split? And why do the discipline's periodic attempts to coin vocabulary that stands outside the whole apparatus fail in the uniform way they fail?

The thesis is that philosophical analysis is grid-repair. The three-grid architecture of Chapter 7 — the ontological grid of real distinctions, the epistemological grid of grasped diffs, the linguistic grid of labels, ordered by containment — predicts both the damage and the repair. The damage is the projection mechanism of Chapter 8 operating on vocabulary, since a mind constituted by distinctions, unable to image what outruns its registrations, substitutes an epistemic or linguistic surrogate and does not notice the substitution.

The repair is fission. The folk word splits along the boundaries it had papered over — sometimes the boundaries between grids, sometimes the boundaries between distinct addresses within one grid — and the terminal cross-grid form of the split, one term per grid, is the form the architecture makes available.

The escape attempts are the closure argument encountered from inside, since coinages engineered to exceed the grids arrive, as the exhibitive closure requires, already gridded. The appendix's distinctive contribution is therefore the aetiology of the grids' conflations: an account of why the damage recurs, where it clusters, and in which direction it runs, from which the shape of the method follows. The distinction between the grids is ancient, whereas the aetiology is the new element.

The apparatus should be restated for readers who begin here. A diff is the book's minimum unit of determinate content: one of two, individuated by contrast, since any content that excludes no alternative specifies nothing (Chapter 2, §2.1). The biconditional of Chapter 7 holds that something is meaningful if and only if it is a diff, and it generates three grids.

The ontological grid, written G_O, is the set of all real distinctions, whether or not any mind registers them. The epistemological grid, G_E, is the set of all diffs as grasped by some mind. The linguistic grid, G_L, is the set of all labels attached to grasped diffs. The three are nested by containment, $G_L \subseteq G_E \subseteq G_O$, since every label names a grasp and every grasp answers to a real distinction, while neither inclusion

reverses, because reality outruns registration and registration outruns naming (Chapter 7, §3).

The closure of the grid says that nothing meaningful stands outside this architecture, since every cognitive and linguistic act is a diff. In its exhibitive form the closure defeats any counterexample offered, which arrives already gridded, because exhibiting it is grasping and labelling a contrast. The mechanism is self-vindicating and the result is established, at the tier of the thesis the mechanism runs through (Chapter 7, §4.1). These four pieces — the diff, the biconditional, the three nested grids, the closure — are everything the appendix uses.

The appendix accordingly presupposes the diff and the distinction between structural and epistemic content (Chapter 2, §2.1), the three-grid architecture with its containment relations (Chapter 7, §§2–3), the closure in both forms (Chapter 7, §4), and the representational analysis of projection (Chapter 8, §3). It introduces no new structural premise.

It does introduce one new application, and grades it where it is made, on the book's four-term confidence ladder (General Introduction, §5). The reading of analytic method as grid-repair is constructed — the best available account of a real pattern, argued through cases, with rivals remaining — while the organisational programme that extends the reading, together with the predictions the programme licenses, is proposed. The inherited apparatus keeps the grades Chapter 7 assigns it, since nothing in this appendix strengthens or weakens those.

The appendix is the sibling of Appendix B, and the two divide one diagnosis. Appendix B reads the traditions' engagements with the terminus and finds one condition beneath the vocabularies of One, Nothing, and Ein Sof. This appendix reads philosophy's engagement with the grids themselves: what the discipline is doing when it splits a word, polices a transfer, or coins a term meant to stand outside language, thought, and being at once. The first is a map of content, and the second a map of method. Appendix A stands before both, assembling the one answer the two maps serve.

2 The Mechanism

2.1 The folk word as a bundle

A word of ordinary language is a linguistic-grid item, a label, lashed to a cluster of diffs, and nothing in the ordinary use of language requires the cluster to respect grid boundaries. Language is optimised for coordination, and coordination tolerates mixed addresses.

A word survives if speakers converge on it well enough for practical purposes, and for practical purposes the difference between a real distinction, the grasp of a distinction, and the label of a distinction almost never matters, since the cases travel together. The person who knows where the well is, believes truly where the well is, and can say where the well is behaves identically in the village. One word suffices.

The bundle becomes a philosophical problem the moment the grid-faces come apart under pressure, when a case arises in which the components that ordinarily travel together travel separately. Then two speakers can use the one word, each keyed to a different face of the bundle, and produce the appearance of a single disagreement where there are in fact two compatible claims and no common question.

The determination dilemma (Chapter 2, §2.4) guarantees that each face, taken separately, is in order, since each excludes an alternative and is therefore a diff with a definite grid-address. What is not in order is the label's pretence that the addresses coincide.

The fault lines come in two species, and the distinction matters throughout. A bundle can straddle the grids, with the folk word lashing an ontological face to an epistemic or linguistic one, and the repair is then cross-grid fission, the splitting whose terminal form is one term per grid.

Or a bundle can lash together two occupants of a single grid: one label over two distinct diffs at the same level, as "infinity" holds two ontological conditions under one word (§3.4). The repair is then intra-grid fission, the assignment of separate addresses within one grid. Both are grid-repair, because the grids supply the address space in both cases,

and, as §2.2 shows, both kinds of conflation can share a single aetiology.

2.2 Projection and the direction of error

Why do the bundles form, and why do they form where they form? The answer is inherited from Chapter 8. A mind constituted by distinctions cannot form a positive image of what outruns its registrations, so where the mind must nevertheless represent such a thing — an absence, a limit, a property whose obtaining exceeds every available detection — it substitutes the nearest registrable surrogate and projects it, with the substitution invisible from inside the representing mind (Chapter 8, §3).

Chapter 8 applied the mechanism to a single spectacular case, the imagery of nothingness, the singularity pictured as a dot in a void. But the mechanism generalises. Wherever a term's ontological address outruns epistemic access, so that the real distinctions the term answers to exceed what registration delivers, the mind silently trades the ontological face for an epistemic or linguistic one, and the bundle acquires a fault line at that point.

The generalisation yields the two great families of cross-grid error. The first is projection proper: the features of one grid painted into another. The metaethical instance is direction projection (Chapter 14, §3.5): a mind whose evaluative registrations arrive as felt pulls, unable to represent value undirected, paints the pull into the facts and produces the picture of objective favouring. The epistemological instance is the relocation Chapter 16 (§3.3) performs on the bindingness of logic: valence engaged by logical structure, imaged as a third, response-free source of authority standing behind the structure. The temporal instance is the ordering the mind supplies to eternity: temporal sequence requires distinction (Chapter 5, §2.1), so the picture of the terminus as a state "before" the first change imports sequence where there is none to import. In each case the direction is the same: an epistemic feature (how the thing registers) is relocated into the ontological grid as a feature of the thing.

The second family is collapse: the legislation of one grid into another. Verificationism collapses the ontological grid into the epistemological, since what cannot be verified is declared meaningless and the real is cut to the measure of the registrable. Linguistic idealism collapses the ontological grid into the linguistic.

The myth of the given, on Chapter 2's diagnosis (§3), is the mirror error, since it is the search for epistemic items that carry their content grid-free, prior to all contrast. And the classical theological conjunction diagnosed across Chapters 8–12 is the grandest collapse of all: the two infinities, one the endless extension of the ontological grid and the other its complete emptiness, forced under a single word.

Beyond naming these errors, the mechanism predicts their distribution. Conflations should cluster where the ontological grid outruns the epistemological — value, modality, consciousness, the terminus — since those are the regions where the mind must represent what it cannot registrationally image. And the illicit transfers should run predominantly upward in the grid containment, from the smaller grids into the larger.

Intra-grid conflation is covered by the same route, since where one of two occupants of a single grid outruns registration, the mind images it through the other and the pair fuses under one label — the two-infinities conflation being just this, an intra-grid fusion sustained by a cross-grid substitution. The history of philosophy, read as an error record, is consistent with both the clustering and the direction, though §3's gallery is no distribution, so the clustering claim stands as a prediction the record has not yet been organised to test.

2.3 The transfer rules

The grid containment of Chapter 7 (§3) — every label attaches to a grasped diff, every grasped diff answers to a real distinction, and neither inclusion reverses — can be restated as a set of norms. The restatement adds only explicitness to the architecture.

Within a grid, inference travels freely on the ordinary logical rails. Across grids, it does not. An ascent from the linguistic or

epistemological grid to the ontological — from "we cannot say it" to "we cannot grasp it", or from "we cannot grasp it" to "it is not" — requires a licence, because the containments run the other way: the larger grid is not exhausted by the smaller. Inconceivability therefore does not deliver impossibility, and unnameability does not deliver unreality.

The reverse transfers fail in a different way: from "it is" nothing follows about grasp or label. The positions this opens — real but unregistered, grasped but unnamed — are permanently available and sometimes occupied. The book's own conduct at the terminus is the discipline in exemplary form. Chapter 12 grants that nothing positive can be said of equality and refuses, at every point, to convert that linguistic and epistemic poverty into an ontological resource. What cannot be said is, by that fact alone, merely unsaid.

Stated so, the rules look like common sense. Much of the analytic tradition has enforced them piecemeal: the ban on epistemic readings of modal operators, the use–mention distinction, the resistance to ontological arguments that conjure existence from definition.

What the tradition has enforced piecemeal, the architecture derives at once. The rules are the containment relations read as traffic law; their authority is the authority of the biconditional they rest on; their scope is total, because the closure guarantees there is no vocabulary outside their jurisdiction.

One rule carries a name the main text uses. The containment of the linguistic grid in the epistemological, read as a norm, is the anchoring requirement of Chapter 14 (§3.6). Labels transmit content while registration creates it, so a vocabulary circular at its base must exit somewhere into a grasped contrast or pass nothing around but itself. Arithmetic exits into registered distinctness, logic into registered exclusion. The audit of the value-vocabulary under the rule is the metaethics' sharpest instrument.

The rule has a second application the main text uses at Chapter 14 (§A.6). A representation on the epistemological grid can run while the registration that anchored it is silent: the learned vocabulary deployed

cold. The ontological claim that its object is independent of every register is a separate address. Reading the first as evidence for the second is an ascent with no licence, the contraband §4.1 confiscates under other names: the autonomy of a representation travelling as the autonomy of what it represents. The metaethics places the realist's affect-free apprehension there, as an anchored representation deployed while the register rests, with the refuting left to the vacancy result.

3 The Evidence

3.1 The fission gallery

The prediction is that mature analysis resolves folk bundles into their grid-addresses, splitting across the grids where the bundle straddles them and assigning separate addresses within a grid where it fuses two occupants. The record is the discipline's highlight reel. The table gives the reel in one view — the word, how it split, the successor terms, and the text that did the cutting; three of its rows are then taken more slowly.

The folk word	The split	The successor terms	Key text
"is"	Intra-grid: three logical functions	Predication; identity; existence	Frege
"means"	Cross-grid: O against E	Reference: the object Sense: the mode of presentation	Frege (1892)
"knows"	Cross-grid: E against O	Justification; truth — with the missing clause between them	Gettier (1963)

The folk word	The split	The successor terms	Key text
"true"	The full triple	Correspondence (O); ideal warrant (E); disquotation (L)	Tarski (1944)
"vague"	The full triple	Ontic (E. Barnes, 2010); epistemicist (Williamson, 1994); semantic	—
"possible"	The full triple	Metaphysical; epistemic; conceptual	—
"necessary", "a priori", "analytic"	The full triple, one term per grid	Metaphysical necessity; a priority; analyticity	Kripke (1980); §3.2

Being and meaning. Frege's decomposition of "is" — the "is" of predication, of identity, of existence — is the founding fission, of the intra-grid species: one label over three logical functions. Its most consequential payoff is nonetheless a transfer rule, since the existence reading operates at second order, as a claim about concepts. The collapse into first-order predication is the very engine of the ontological argument: an ascent from the linguistic grid to the ontological without a licence. His sense and reference (1892) then split "means" between the grids: the reference is the object, the real relatum; the sense is the mode of presentation, the shape of the grasp. The informativeness of "the morning star is the evening star" is one ontological item carrying two epistemological addresses — a mismatch the folk bundle cannot represent.

Knowledge. The Gettier cases (1963) pry the faces of "knows" apart, holding the epistemic component, the believer's justification, fixed while the ontological component, the truth of the matter, arrives by luck. Six decades of post-Gettier epistemology are, on one reading, the search for the missing clause that would re-solder an O-face to an E-

face; on the knowledge-first reading (Williamson, 2000) the search was misconceived, knowledge being prime and the faces its consequences, a reading the architecture accommodates, since a prime state can still be located across two grids. The difficulty of the search is what the architecture predicts on either reading, because the faces are truly distinct.

Truth. The three great families of truth theory each guard one grid-face of the folk word: correspondence answers to the ontological face, epistemic theories to the epistemological, deflationary and semantic accounts to the linguistic. Tarski's treatment (1944) is explicitly an exercise in linguistic-grid hygiene; the deflationist will object that her thesis concerns the property, of which there is none; the placement locates where her denial does its work. Read as rivals about one property, the families generate a standoff; read as accounts of three faces of one bundle, each is substantially right about its face. The residual question — which face the word should keep — is a question about the label, one the world leaves open. The remaining rows of the table follow the same pattern. The maturity of the vagueness debate shows in the fact that its parties now know which address they are defending.

3.2 The centrepiece: Kripke's tripartition

One episode deserves to be lifted from the gallery, because it is the architecture's cleanest single confirmation. Before Kripke, "necessary" and "a priori" were treated as coextensive, and the empiricist tradition ran "analytic" together with both: three styles for one exalted status.

Naming and Necessity (1980) split the bundle three ways: metaphysical necessity, a matter of how reality is across possibilities; a priority, a matter of how a truth can be known; and analyticity, a matter of what the words guarantee. The tripartition is the three-grid partition, one term per grid — ontological, epistemological, linguistic — and Kripke's celebrated results are demonstrations that the grids, though nested, are distinct. The necessary a posteriori, Hesperus is Phosphorus, water is H_2O, is an ontological-grid necessity whose epistemological

address is empirical, since membership in G_O settles no question about the route through G_E.

The contingent a priori, the standard metre, is the converse lesson from the linguistic side, since a label fixed by stipulation confers an epistemic shortcut without conferring ontological necessity.

What the framework adds to the episode is the two questions Kripke did not pose. Why had the bundle formed? Because modal reality, outrunning registration, had been imaged through its epistemic access for two centuries, which is projection by the book. And why did the split, once made, prove terminal? Nothing analogous has fissioned from it since, and the subsequent refinements, two-dimensional semantics among them, articulate structure within the grids. On the present reading there is no fourth to add, since the architecture has three, where the tripartition was the moment a folk bundle completed its repair.

3.3 The trajectory

The gallery supports a claim about direction. Debates mature by drifting toward the triple: the folk word enters carrying its bundle, the first fission separates two faces, subsequent pressure locates the third, so the debate stabilises when each grid-face has its own label and the residual disputes have become within-grid, tractable by ordinary argument where they are tractable at all.

The drift is a tendency with a mechanism, and a tendency is all the claim requires, since the mechanism is simply that cross-grid conflation is the unstable configuration, the one that generates apparent standoffs and mutual incomprehension, and repair relieves the instability. Where a debate has not drifted, the reading therefore predicts either that its central term's bundle does not in fact straddle grids, or that the repair is still pending — and §5 stakes the reading on named cases of the second kind.

3.4 The framework's own practice

The reflexive observation should be made here, before a reviewer makes it. This book is a fission engine, and its own splits exhibit both

species. The split on which everything rests is cross-grid: structural difference against epistemic content (Chapter 2, §2.1) divides the folk word "content" between the ontological and epistemological grids in the book's opening moves. The two axes of certainty (Chapter 17, §2) repeat the pattern, since the folk word bundles the logical status of a claim with the felt state of the believer, an object-side face and a subject-side face under one label.

The rest of the book's fissions are predominantly of the second species, and the two infinities are its paradigm. Infinite diversity and infinite equality are both ontological conditions, two occupants of a single grid holding one label between them, and the repair of Chapter 8 assigns each its own address within that grid.

What is cross-grid about the case is the persistence of the damage. The conflation survived for millennia because one of the two occupants, infinite equality, outruns registration, so the mind imaged it through the other; the projection mechanism thus explains why an intra-grid conflation held fast against every ordinary pressure to disambiguate.

The same shape recurs across the book. "Ground" leaves as relatum-ground and limit-ground (Chapter 4, §3). "Creation" leaves as origination, transformation, and dependence (Chapter 9). "Nothing" leaves as equality and non-existence (Chapters 5 and 8), one real ontological occupant and one label with no occupant at all, so the fission simultaneously assigns an address and exposes a vacancy. "Goodness" divides by object and operation (Chapter 14, §4). "God" leaves as ground and mind (Chapter 10), two ontological occupants one name has carried together through the classical tradition, and "peace" as the managed and the structural condition (Chapter 21). "Equality" is no member of this list: the book borrows the word for the undifferentiated side of its partition, a borrowing the Glossary marks off from the social sense. Its distance from social equality is a warning about a loan; there was no fusion to repair.

The Glossary is, read in this light, a placement table: some two hundred terms, each assigned its grid, its location within it, and its contrasts. The appendix therefore describes no method it does not use. It

is the book's own engine, run on the discipline that built it — and the closure explains why the engine cannot be modest about its scope while remaining candid about its verdicts, since there is nowhere else for a meaningful term to live.

4 The Diagnostic

4.1 The grid-address test

The mechanism yields a usable instrument, the three-address test. For any contested term T, ask three questions. What does T pick out in the ontological grid: which real distinction, if any, does it answer to? What does T pick out in the epistemological grid: which mode of grasp, warrant, or registration? And what work does T's label do in the linguistic grid — what does the word coordinate, abbreviate, or honour? Call the answers T's grid-address.

A dispute in which the parties return different addresses consists of at least two compatible claims wearing one word, so the test's first service is to replace the standoff with its component questions. The questions can also each return more than one answer, one label over two occupants of a single grid, in which case the test prescribes intra-grid fission, with the two infinities as the book's paradigm (§3.4).

Its second service is negative and derives from the transfer rules, since any argument that moves between the addresses is checked for its licence, and the recurrent contraband — inconceivability travelling as impossibility, unverifiability as unreality, stipulation as necessity — is confiscated at the border. Its third service is completeness: by the closure, the test never returns void, since every meaningful term has an address, including the terms engineered to lack one, which is §4.4's subject.

The classic tangle over the existence of numbers illustrates the first service in one paragraph. The Platonist's affirmation is keyed to the ontological face, a domain of real distinctions independent of registration. The constructivist's denial is keyed to the epistemological, existence as constructibility, an available route of grasp. The formalist's

deflation is keyed to the linguistic, number-talk as a disciplined notation. Three addresses, three defensible claims, and one folk word, “exist”, generating the appearance of a single war.

4.2 What the tradition anticipated

The test has ancestors; charity requires naming them and locating the difference. Carnap’s explication (1950b) is the practice without the map: the deliberate replacement of an inexact folk concept by sharpened successors. What it lacks is an account of why the successors so regularly come grid-indexed, or of where the inexactness concentrates.

Ryle’s category mistakes (1949) are the nearest ancestor in spirit, being errors of address. But Ryle’s categories were as many as the occasions demanded: an open list with no ordering. The grids supply the minimal principled set — three members, containment-ordered, derived from the biconditional in a single move. Sider’s (2011) joint-carving is the ontological address made the whole of the enterprise, a vocabulary graded by how well it fits the world’s structure; the grids keep that address and add the two the fission record shows the folk word straddling.

Chalmers’s treatment of verbal disputes (2011), with its method of barring the contested term and re-asking the questions, is the hygiene without the aetiology: it detects the tangles one at a time, while explaining neither their recurrence nor their distribution. It also runs a deflationary risk the architecture blocks, since exposure as cross-grid leaves a dispute substantive. Each component question survives in its own grid, as real as it ever was; what dissolves is only the illusion that they were one question.

The appendix’s claim against the tradition is accordingly modest. The skill was always there, and the gallery of §3 is its proof. What the tradition worked without is the mechanism. It could perform the repairs, brilliantly, without any theory of why the damage recurs, where it clusters, and which direction it runs.

4.3 Conceptual engineering and the missing aetiology

The programme's nearest contemporary neighbour must be addressed directly, because it now organises much of metaphilosophy. Conceptual engineering is the project of assessing and improving representational devices (Cappelen, 2018), the field that gathers Carnapian explication, Haslanger's ameliorative analyses of "woman" and "race" (Haslanger, 2000), and the broader conceptual ethics of which these are instances (Burgess & Plunkett, 2013). Its question is normative: which concepts are defective, what should replace them, and whether the replacement can be carried out.

The appendix's question is explanatory instead: why concepts break where they break, why the damage clusters and runs in one direction, and what the space of repairs is. The two projects therefore divide the territory without competing, and the dependence runs one way, since a prescription presupposes a diagnosis, and the engineering literature, by its own practice, works with an intuitive inventory of defects — vagueness, incoherence, harmfulness, mismatch with purpose — and has no theory of them.

The framework supplies the theory. In the grid vocabulary, a concept is defective in one of four ways: when its bundle straddles addresses it pretends to unite, when it fuses two occupants of one grid, when its label has no occupant at all, or when a projection has hardened into an intuition. The aetiology of §2.2 then says which defects will arise where, and why they will resist the engineer.

That resistance is the field's own hardest datum, and the aetiology bears on it directly. Cappelen's most discussed conclusion is pessimistic, since meaning change is largely beyond anyone's control, so deliberate engineering will rarely succeed as intended.

The mechanism refines the pessimism into a prediction with structure. Where a defect is mere drift or looseness, revision is ordinary and often succeeds. Where the defect is a projection, as with direction projection in "objective value" or the epistemic surrogate in "necessary", the defective usage is an output of the representational machinery itself, regenerated as fast as it is legislated away. Engineering

should therefore fail there in the specific way it historically does: the stipulation is accepted and the old usage returns.

And the objection the field inherits from Strawson's (1963) reply to Carnap, that revision changes the subject, receives a statement and a partial answer in the address vocabulary. A revision preserves its topic when it preserves the grid-address and redistributes only the bundle, and it changes the subject when it moves the address. The severing of "woman" into distinct social and biological addresses, on this reading, is fission, and fission discovers a second subject where the objection assumed one. The claim, costed with the rest of the programme, is proposed, and its content is that the framework offers the engineers the one thing their own literature concedes it lacks: a theory of the damage the engineering is for.

4.4 The escape attempts

Philosophy has repeatedly attempted the complementary manoeuvre: the coining of vocabulary meant to exit the grids, terms reaching for what is beyond being, beyond grasp, beyond language, or beyond all three at once. The record of these attempts is the closure argument encountered from inside, and the verdict is uniform because the exhibitive closure (Chapter 7, §4.1) makes it uniform: the exhibited counterexample arrives already gridded.

The gallery of exits is distinguished. Kant's noumenon, in its positive employment, is a label purporting to name what stands beyond every condition of grasp, while the label is itself a grasped, contrasted, gridded item, which is why Kant's own discipline confines the term to a negative, boundary-marking use (Chapter 7, §4.2). Tarski's hierarchy of metalanguages escapes each language upward into another, while each rung is another gridded language, so the ladder maps the closure without exiting it.

Wittgenstein's ladder is thrown away in a sentence that is itself exhibited, said, and understood (Chapter 7, §4.3). Heidegger's Nichts, engineered with a coined verb expressly to block assimilation to the category of beings, achieves a real linguistic-grid innovation whose

phenomenological content Appendix B (§3.3) relocates to the experiencing subject.

Nāgārjuna's emptiness of emptiness (Appendix B, §3.4) and the Dionysian "beyond affirmation and negation" (Appendix B, §4.2) are the contemplative traditions' versions of the same move. And the most explicitly engineered of all is Derrida's (1968) différance, the alteration inaudible in speech, the term declared by its author to be neither a word nor a concept. It is a coinage designed to signal its own inadequacy in the act of use, and a device the main text engages on its own terms (Chapter 2, §4). The structural reading is the same in every case: each device is an operation within the linguistic grid wearing exit clothing. The more ingenious the engineering, the more clearly it demonstrates that the exit cannot be engineered.

The verdict should end generously, because the failures are informative. Escape-vocabulary fails as exit and succeeds as cartography, since each coinage marks, fairly sharply, a point at which predication strains, so the strain-points map the boundary the closure describes, with the traditions' own hedges acknowledging as much. Here the two appendices meet: one condition under three names, one boundary under many coinages — a single diagnosis, applied to content and to method.

5 The Triviality Objection

The objection deserves its strongest form. That there is a difference between how things are, how they are known, and how they are said is among the oldest observations in philosophy — older than the use–mention distinction, older than the map and the territory. If the appendix's thesis is that these three should not be confused, it has dressed a freshman maxim in the book's notation, and the dress is the only contribution.

The reply has three parts, and the first concedes everything the objection is entitled to: the maxim is obvious, and the appendix does not claim it. What it claims is an architecture, a mechanism, and a record, none of which the maxim contains. The charge is familiar within the

book (Chapter 2, §6.1), and the reply has the same shape, since what looks like a truism turns out, stated in full, to be a set of commitments with enemies.

The architecture is a set of contested theses wearing the maxim's clothes. The tradition holds the three registers as loose common sense, whereas the framework derives them from one premise, orders them by containment, and closes them — and each of those moves is denied by named positions.

That every grasp answers to a real distinction, the inclusion of the epistemological grid in the ontological, is rejected by every idealism worth the name. That the ascent from conceivability to possibility requires a licence the epistemic materials cannot themselves supply is rejected by the modal rationalist programme, whose two-dimensional machinery is an explicit attempt to certify the very transfer the rules stop at the border. And that no coinage exits the grids is denied, in their different idioms, by Kant's positive noumenon, the apophatic traditions, and the engineering of différance, which is why §4.4 proceeds by argument. A platitude has no enemies, whereas the architecture has several; they are live research programmes.

The mechanism is what separates hygiene from theory. "Do not confuse the registers" explains nothing, and least of all the fact most in need of explanation: that the discipline's best practitioners confuse them repeatedly, in the same regions, in the same direction, under full possession of the maxim. The psychology of reasoning did not become trivial when it stopped issuing the injunction to avoid error and began supplying mechanisms that predict which errors occur, where they cluster, and why they persist in subjects who know better. The appendix stands to the maxim as that literature stands to the injunction. Projection is an aetiology: a mind constituted by distinctions must image the unregistrable through surrogates, so the violations concentrate where the ontological grid outruns registration and travel upward through the grid containment. A maxim generates no such predictions. A mechanism does, and can be caught failing (§6).

The record settles which of the two the history resembles. If the maxim were operationally obvious, its violations would be beginners' errors, corrected in the seminar and absent from the canon.

Instead the equivalence of the necessary and the a priori stood, with rare dissent, from Kant to 1970, and Kripke's splitting of the bundle was received as a revolution, a reception a reminder never gets. Verificationism was a generation's flagship programme, built on a collapse of the ontological grid into the epistemological by the philosophers best positioned to know the maxim. The ontological argument persuaded Descartes and Leibniz. And the projection this book diagnoses at the centre of metaethics remains, at the time of writing, the actively defended commitment of a substantial part of the field.

A rule that everyone affirms and the most careful repeatedly break has therefore ceased to be a truism and become an explanandum, and the gap between affirming the distinction and keeping it is the size of the mechanism this appendix supplies.

6 What the Claim Is and Is Not

The claims must be costed separately, because they sit on different rungs.

What is inherited keeps its grades. The biconditional, the three-grid architecture, the containment relations, and the closure carry the confidences Chapter 7 assigns them, with the exhibitive closure and the rest established, and the transfer rules of §2.3 are those relations restated, adding no new exposure.

The reading of analytic method as grid-repair is constructed: the fission pattern as predicted repair, the conflation clusters as predicted damage, the projection mechanism as the aetiology. It is the best available account of a real pattern, argued through the cases of §3, with live rivals remaining. Among them are the deflationary view that philosophical analysis is piecemeal housekeeping with no deeper shape, sociological accounts that trace the fission pattern to the incentives of

professionalised inquiry, and Williamson's (2007) metaphilosophy, on which philosophical questions are seldom about words or concepts at all, so that the fission record is incidental to the subject matter it happens to refine.

The organisational programme — the placement of old and new vocabulary at its grid-addresses, the reading of rival systems by their characteristic grid-operations — is proposed, and its most important discipline is what it does not claim.

Placing a term is not absorbing a system. To locate Kant's noumenon is not to refute transcendental idealism, and to give verificationism's collapse a name is not to answer its motivations. Systems that agree about every address can remain rivals about every within-grid question, and the within-grid questions are most of philosophy. The grids adjudicate conflations between the grids; they answer none of the questions inside them.

Nor is the fission claim the claim that all splits are cross-grid. Intra-grid fission is the method's second species (§2.1), and much of the finest analysis is of that kind, since Ryle's knowing-how and knowing-that divide the epistemological grid internally, while the two infinities divide the ontological grid (§3.4). The specific claim is that the ontological–epistemological–linguistic triple is the terminal form of cross-cutting analysis, the shape repair takes when the bundle straddles the grids, and that both species are grid-work, since the grids supply the address space within which either split is stated.

The proposal states its exposure, and three findings would tell against it.

First, mature debates whose stabilisation shows no drift toward grid-indexed successor terms: if repairs regularly completed in forms the architecture does not provide, it would be idle. Read strictly, since the intra-grid/cross-grid distinction (§2.1) lets the reading file any split two ways, what would count is a mature repair whose successor terms the address vocabulary cannot state at all, neither as grid-indexed nor as separate addresses within one grid; the gallery of §3 is selected, as galleries are, so the third condition asks for the episode the selection

would have to have omitted. Second, recurring philosophical conflations clustering away from the regions where the ontological grid outruns the epistemological: if the great tangles arose as often over the readily registrable as over value, modality, consciousness, and the terminus, the projection aetiology would be wrong. Third, an analytical episode of the first rank that grid-placement leaves dark — a celebrated clarification whose gain the address vocabulary cannot state.

And the proposal names its predictions, because a programme that cannot be caught failing is not a programme.

"Emergence" is a fission in progress, since the literature's own division into weak and strong emergence is an epistemological/ontological split still wearing one word, so the reading predicts its completion. "Information" awaits the triple, and the diff is unusually native to it, since a physical difference in the world, a registered difference in a receiver, and an encoded difference in a notation are three addresses the folk word merges daily. And the personal-identity literature, on this reading, has been negotiating for two centuries among ontological criteria of persistence, the first-person epistemology of anticipation, and the conventions of the label "same person" — which is one way of stating what Parfit (1984) demonstrated by other means.

7 The Register as Method

One instrument of the book's own remains to be placed, and it belongs here for the reason §3.4 gave: the appendix describes no method it does not use. The Premise Register is that method made explicit. The instrument the Register applies is separable from the system it grades; it should be stated once as a procedure, because nothing in it mentions difference, value, or God.

Four steps constitute it. Enumerate a system's results and mark the principal ones, those later work presupposes. Grade each on an ordinal ladder whose every grade names its defeat condition, arguing the grade where the result is proved and never in the summary alone. List each result's presuppositions by name, so that inheritance is explicit and the

weakest-premise rule can be enforced mechanically. Then audit the assembled graph — load paths, single points of failure, quarantine boundaries — the operations the General Conclusion (§§1–2) performs on the present system. The ladder's terms would change with a subject matter's proof-forms, while the discipline would not.

A fifth step, which this book adds to its own register, groups the rows under the claims they carry, in the order the General Introduction sets the claims out from bedrock to keystone (§3), so that the audit reads from the claim down as well as from the row up: rejecting a claim shows the rows that go with it, and rejecting a row shows the claim it weakens.

The procedure has neighbours, and the comparison locates its design. Structured confidence vocabularies transformed the usability of results elsewhere, since the calibrated uncertainty language of the IPCC (Mastrandrea et al., 2010) and the GRADE system of evidence-based medicine (Guyatt et al., 2008) let a field state, in common terms, how hard each of its claims may be leaned on. Philosophy's hedging has by contrast remained private practice, with each author's "plausibly" and "arguably" calibrated to nothing shared.

The Register is a philosophy-native analogue, and native in one deliberate respect: its measure is ordinal and its unit is the location of dissent. A philosophical result's support is structural — a challenger must reject this defended premise at this cost — so the Register records where resistance must be lodged and what it costs, which is checkable, where a numerical credence would report an author's psychology to two decimal places. Toulmin (1958) is the argument-level ancestor, warrant and backing made explicit, so the Register does for a system of arguments what that layout does for one.

What the instrument buys can be put against the discipline's standing complaint. Chalmers (2015b) diagnoses philosophy's shortfall as the absence of collective convergence on its central questions.

A register manufactures no convergence, and it changes what disagreement is, since every entry makes dissent addressable: a reader who rejects a result can be shown the premise she must reject, the tier

her rejection moves, and the chapters that stand or fall with her choice. Disagreement located is disagreement that can be worked on. Graded in its own terms, the procedure is constructed as a method claim: the best available instrument for the job, its rivals named and the comparison argued. The wager that the discipline's deficit lies in missing load-bearing structure for arguments to accumulate in, and only derivatively in the arguments, is proposed.

A closing note on method, in the register of Appendix B. This appendix is parasitic on the main text in the same strict sense, since every claim it makes is licensed by results established there, and it adds no structural premise, its one addition being an application graded at the point of use.

Its engagement with the tradition is charitable by construction, since its central finding is that the tradition's signature method works, and works for a reason the method itself never stated. And it practises the discipline it describes: the vocabulary of this appendix — bundle, fission, address, transfer, escape — consists of labels attached to grasped distinctions answering to real ones, three grids deep, like everything it discusses, and like the sentence that says so.

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